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Atē in the Homeric poems* 
 
Agathe Thornton in memoriam 
 
In a recent paper on atē in Aeschylus, Alan Sommerstein makes a powerful case for 
the view of a number of earlier interpreters that ‘harm’ (Schaden) is the core meaning 
of atē.1 Sommerstein argues that atē must have entered poetic language from ordinary 
                                                 
*
 This paper derives, less tangentially than one might think, from a project on 
language, emotion, and society in Classical Greece funded by the Leverhulme Trust. I 
am very grateful to the Trust for their support. I should also like to thank PLLS’s 
anonymous reviewer, whose constructive comments have improved this article in 
several places, and Professor Alan Sommerstein for generously allowing me to cite 
the unpublished work that initially inspired my own research.  
1
 Sommerstein (forthcoming). His predecessors include: Havers (1910) 238; Latte 
(1920/1) 255 = (1968) 4; Stallmach (1968), esp. 1, 12-14, 24, 29, 31, 46-7, 59, 63, 80-
4, 88, 94-5, 102;* Mette (1955), esp. 6-7; Frisk (1960-72) i.178 s.v. ἄτη; Chantraine 
(1968-80) i.3 s.v. ἀάω; Dawe (1968) 104-5;* Stinton (1975) 244; Saïd (1978) 77-8, 
84; Padel (1995) 168, 170, 174, 178-9. See now Beekes (2010) i.162-3 s.v. ἄτη. The 
explanation is an ancient one: see Σ D on Il. 1.412; D, bT on Il. 2.111; bT on Il. 9.504, 
505; bT on Il. 19.91; D on Il. 19.95; Σ V on Od. 15.233; Hsch. α 5 (ἀ ά α τ ο ν ), 24-
32 (ἀ ά σ α ι -ἀ α σ τ ό ν ), 35 (ἀ ᾶ τ α ι ), 37 (ἀ ά τ ο ι ς ), 38 (ἄ α τ ο ν ), 40 
2 
speech, where the earliest evidence for its use is in Cretan legal inscriptions, in which 
it means ‘harm’, ‘damage’, or ‘loss’, a sense that is confirmed by a number of other 
(non-Homeric) sources.
2
 My argument in this paper endorses Sommerstein’s central 
claim about the core meaning of atē. I also agree with him that this core meaning is 
likely to be the term’s original meaning; but though that hypothesis is both compatible 
with and, in a sense, supported by my own analysis, I do not rely upon it in what 
follows. Furthermore, I consider only the usage of atē, not its etymology, because the 
                                                                                                                                           
(ἀ α τ ύ λ ο ν ), 4636 (ἀ ν α τ ί ), 8050 (ἀ τ έ ο ν τ α ), 8075 (ἄτη), 8078 
(ἀτηρόν), 8214 (ἀτωμένη); η 573 (ἣ ν  ἄ τ η ν ); cf. Stallmach (1968) 80 n.135. 
[*On the dating of these items and their ordering in fnn., see bibliography.] 
2
 Sommerstein (forthcoming) [000]: “The earliest traceable meaning of ate (or rather 
awata) is ‘harm, damage, loss’, a semantic range corresponding roughly to that of two 
classical Attic words, blabe and zemia.  In Cretan legal texts it is the regular word for 
a sum to be paid as a penalty or as compensation [IC iv.72, col. VI.9-24, col. XI.31-
42; cf. Stallmach (1968) 64; Mette (1955) 6].  A series of glosses in Hesychius 
demonstrate the existence of a verb a(w)askein or a(w)assein meaning ‘to harm’ 
[s.vv. ἀάβακτοι, ἀάσκει, ἀγατᾶσθαι, ἆσαι, κατέβασκε] ...” Cf. the antithesis 
with kerdos in Hes. Op. 352; Sol. 13.74-5 W; Thgn. 133; A. Cho. 824-5; Eum. 1006-
9; S. OC 92-3; Stallmach (1968) 12, 60, 82; Dawe (1968) 98-9; Saïd (1978) 84; Doyle 
(1984) 29. For others, however, the sense ‘harm’, both in Hom. and in later authors, is 
a secondary development: Seiler (1954), esp. 410, 416-17; Müller (1956) 1-2; cf. 
Francis (1983) 100; Doyle (1984) 1. 
3 
latter is obscure and disputed:
3
 though some suggestions may be philologically more 
probable than others, the only practical way to distinguish between candidates is 
usage, and so one might as well focus solely on that. In that regard, my approach to 
the Homeric evidence is holistic, not developmental, not because development in epic 
semantics and diction is untraceable in principle, but because those who trace such 
development in the case of atē do so parti pris and a priori.4 Instead, I argue that an 
inductive survey of all the instances of atē and its cognates in Homer will show that 
‘harm’ is the single common element that unites them. One could see this as the 
term’s ‘focal meaning’ or ‘primary nuclear sense’, terms developed by G.E.L. Owen 
and J.L. Austin respectively in explanation of Aristotle’s ὁμονυμία πρὸς ἕν (Met. 
Γ, 1003a33ff.), by which the various senses of a term (e.g. ‘healthy’) are in different 
ways related by their focus on a single, central concept (e.g. health). Under either 
description, we are dealing with a prototype effect, a phenomenon explicated at length 
                                                 
3
 See Boisacq (1923) i.96 s.v. ἄτη; Mette (1955) 5-6; Seiler (1954) 409-10 (cf. 
(1955) 9); Frisk (1960-72) i.178 s.v. ἄτη; Chantraine (1968-80) i.3 s.v. ἀάω; 
Beekes (2010) i.162-3 s.v. ἄτη; for recent arguments in favour of particular 
etymologies, see Wyatt (1982); Francis (1983). 
4
 See, e.g. Seiler (1954: repeated in Seiler 1955) on the development, within the Iliad 
itself, from the ‘original’ core meaning of Verblendung expressed by the aor. middle 
of the verb to the ‘new’ active/passive sense, ‘harm’/‘be harmed’; Müller (1956) on 
the development from “die echte alte ἄτη” (pp.5-7), i.e. folly inspired by a hostile 
divinity, to Schaden. 
4 
by Lakoff,
5
 by which certain senses of a term or members of a category assume 
greater salience than others in usage and in the minds of users. But while all instances 
relate in some way to this common feature, Homeric usage is not single; and it is not 
the ‘objective’ sense, ‘ruin’ or ‘disaster’, that is most common in Homer, but the 
‘subjective’ one, ‘error’, ‘folly’, ‘blindness’.6 Thus the Homeric semantics of atē 
exhibit not one, but two prototype effects, with ‘harm’ as the category’s focal 
meaning and ‘folly’ vel sim. as its ‘best example’.7  These two propositions can be 
true, I argue, because even where atē bears the ‘subjective’ sense of ‘folly’ or 
‘blindness’ the ‘objective’ sense of ‘ruin’ is logically prior. The relation between the 
two senses is one of metonymy, a ubiquitous mechanism for the extension of 
semantic categories. In this particular case, the metonymy is a variant of a very 
familiar type, in which a state of mind and a related state of affairs are called by the 
same name, as in the case of English ‘guilt’ or Greek aischynē (both ‘shame’ and 
shame’s object, ‘disgrace’). We might compare the aidōs that, in Thersites’ case, is 
not a subjective reaction, but the object on which such a reaction might focus (his 
genitalia, Il. 2.262). Here, the state of mind is the term’s original reference, the state 
of affairs a metonymous extension, but in the case of English ‘guilt’ the converse 
                                                 
5
 See Owen (1960) 169 = (1985) 184 (cf. Hamlyn (1977/8); Shields (1999), esp. 226-
36; Ward (2008), esp. 3, 17-18, 62-4, 98-102, 108-11); Austin (1979) 71; Lakoff 
(1987), esp. 18-19 on the effect identified by Owen and Austin. 
6
 Cf. Padel (1995) 184. 
7
 On the latter, see Lakoff (1987) 7, 26, 45, 85-6. In my view, recognition of these two 
forms of prototypicality meets Neuburg’s demand (1993: 499) for an account of the 
unity behind the senses of atē that does not “rationalize away the illusion of duality” 
in Homeric usage. 
5 
relation obtains. In my view, the logical priority of ‘ruin’ over ‘folly’ in the semantics 
of atē suggests that, in chronological terms, its development is more likely to have 
been from objective to subjective; but nothing of what follows depends upon the truth 
of that hypothesis.  
 
This established, I go on to investigate what kind of error or folly atē is, what its 
implications are for Homeric ideas of agency and responsibility, and why this sense, 
rather than the ‘objective’ one, should be the Homeric (and especially the Iliadic) 
prototype. Consideration of these issues will require us also to investigate the extent 
to which the sense and reference of atē overlap with those of atasthaliē, and to think 
more generally about the relative importance of each of these concepts in the two 
poems’ construction of plot and character. 
 
The basic sense ‘harm’ is especially apparent in the usage of the verb, aaō. At Od. 
21.293-304, for example, the verb is used to describe both the harmful effect of wine 
on the senses and the damage that this can do to one’s fortunes:  
 
 “οἶνός σε τρώει μελιηδής, ὅς τε καὶ ἄλλους 
 βλάπτει, ὃς ἄν μιν χανδὸν ἕλῃ  μηδ' αἴσιμα πίνῃ . 
 οἶνος καὶ Κένταυρον, ἀγακλυτὸν Εὐρυτίωνα,  
 295 
 ἄασ' ἐνὶ μεγάρῳ  μεγαθύμου Πειριθόοιο, 
 ἐς Λαπίθας ἐλθόνθ'· ὁ  δ' ἐπεὶ φρένας ἄασεν οἴνῳ , 
6 
 μαινόμενος κάκ' ἔρεξε δόμον κάτα Πειριθόοιο. 
 ἥρωας δ' ἄχος εἷλε, διὲκ προθύρου δὲ θύραζε 
 ἕλκον ἀναΐξαντες, ἀπ' οὔατα νηλέϊ χαλκῷ    300 
 ῥῖνάς τ' ἀμήσαντες· ὁ  δὲ φρεσὶν ᾗσιν ἀασθεὶς 
 ἤ ϊεν ἣν ἄτην ὀχέων ἀεσίφρονι θυμῷ . 
 ἐξ οὗ Κενταύροισι καὶ ἀνδράσι νεῖκος ἐτύχθη, 
 οἷ δ' αὐτῷ  πρώτῳ  κακὸν εὕρετο οἰνοβαρείων.” 
 
In this passage, in which Antinous compares the disguised Odysseus to the drunken 
centaur, Eurytion, the point of the exemplum is the damage (τρώει) and harm 
(βλάπτει) that wine can cause. At the same time, though it is Eurytion’s mind that is 
affected by the wine, so that it becomes aesiphrōn, the atē that he bears with him as 
he departs seems to include his mutilation at the hands of the Lapiths, the harmful 
state of affairs that results from his harmful state of mind.  
 
Wine is also a factor at Od. 11.61-5, where Elpenor explains: 
 
 “ἆσέ με δαίμονος αἶσα κακὴ καὶ ἀθέσφατος οἶνος· 
 Κίρκης δ' ἐν μεγάρῳ  καταλέγμενος οὐκ ἐνόησα 
 ἄψορρον καταβῆναι ἰὼν ἐς κλίμακα μακρήν, 
7 
 ἀλλὰ  καταντικρὺ τέγεος πέσον· ἐκ δέ μοι αὐχὴν 
 ἀστραγάλων ἐάγη, ψυχὴ  δ' Ἄϊδόσδε κατῆλθε.” 
 
In this case, the harm caused by the “daimōn’s evil fate” may conceivably be 
Elpenor’s death itself, though it could also be divine interference in his thought 
processes, but the harm caused by wine is primarily the befuddlement that caused his 
misjudgement (οὐκ ἐνόησα, 62) and his fall. 
 
The same picture, in which sensory impairment leads to disaster, is apparent also in 
the ‘harm’ caused to Odysseus by the sleep that allowed his companions to open 
Aeolus’ bag of winds in Odyssey 10, and to kill and eat the cattle of the sun in Book 
12.  
 
 “ἄασάν μ' ἕταροί τε κακοὶ πρὸς τοῖσί τε ὕπνος 
 σχέτλιος. ἀλλ' ἀκέσασθε, φίλοι· δύναμις γὰρ ἐν ὑμῖν.” 
      Od. 10.68-9 
 
 “Ζεῦ πάτερ ἠδ' ἄλλοι μάκαρες θεοὶ αἰὲν ἐόντες, 
 ἦ  με μάλ' εἰς ἄτην κοιμήσατε νηλέϊ ὕπνῳ , 
 οἱ δ' ἕταροι μέγα ἔργον ἐμητίσαντο μένοντες.” 
      Od. 12.371-3 
8 
 
Both Odysseus’ companions and sleep caused the misfortune that resulted when the 
winds escaped from the bag, but the sleep also caused the temporary inattention 
which allowed this to take place. In the second passage, atē is the result of the sleep 
sent by Zeus and the other gods – perhaps including the temporary inattention, but 
indisputably and primarily encompassing the harm that resulted.  
 
The verb refers to the harmful results of inattention also in the exemplum of Zeus’ atē 
which is central to Agamemnon’s ‘Apology’ at Il. 19.112-13:  
 
   “Ζεὺς δ' οὔ τι δολοφροσύνην ἐνόησεν, 
 ἀλλ' ὄμοσεν μέγαν ὅρκον, ἔπειτα δὲ πολλὸν ἀάσθη.” 
 
Here, the use of the verb ἀάσθη is at least partially (and I should say primarily) 
motivated by a focus on the results of the deception, even if there is also a reference 
to the deception as such (qua ‘blindness’ or ‘delusion’). This focus would be more 
emphatic if we could be sure that ἔπειτα is temporal (Zeus is deceived by Hera into 
swearing the oath, and then ἀάσθη), as I suspect it is, but it is there even if the 
deception and the misjudgement that it entails are part of the ‘harm’ in question.8  
                                                 
8
 In favour of the temporal sense, see Dawe (1968) 98; against, Leaf (1902) ii.270 on 
19.111; Willcock (1984) 274 on 19.113; Edwards (1991) 251 on 19.113-16. Though 
there are parallels (cited by Edwards) for a modal sense (‘therein’), the view that the 
9 
 
Similar is Il. 8.228-41:  
 
 “αἰδὼς Ἀργεῖοι, κάκ’ ἐλέγχεα, εἶδος ἀγητοί· 
 πῇ  ἔβαν εὐχωλαί, ὅτε δὴ  φάμεν εἶναι ἄριστοι, 
 ἃς ὁπότ’ ἐν Λήμνῳ  κενεαυχέες ἠγοράασθε,   230 
 ἔσθοντες κρέα πολλὰ  βοῶν ὀρθοκραιράων 
 πίνοντες κρητῆρας ἐπιστεφέας οἴνοιο, 
 Τρώων ἄνθ’ ἑκατόν τε διηκοσίων τε ἕκαστος 
 στήσεσθ’ ἐν πολέμῳ · νῦν δ’ οὐδ’ ἑνὸς ἄξιοί εἰμεν 
 Ἕκτορος, ὃς τάχα νῆας ἐνιπρήσει πυρὶ κηλέῳ .   235 
 Ζεῦ πάτερ, ἦ  ῥά τιν' ἤδη ὑπερμενέων βασιλήων 
 τῇδ' ἄτῃ  ἄασας καί μιν μέγα κῦδος ἀπηύρας; 
 οὐ μὲν δή ποτέ φημι τεὸν περικαλλέα βωμὸν 
 νηῒ πολυκλήϊδι παρελθέμεν ἐνθάδε ἔρρων, 
 ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ πᾶσι βοῶν δημὸν καὶ μηρί’ ἔκηα    240 
                                                                                                                                           
adverb does not have its normal, temporal sense seems to me to rest on an a priori 
assumption that ἀάσθη must mean “was blinded” rather than e.g. “was ruined”. 
10 
 ἱέμενος Τροίην εὐτείχεον ἐξαλαπάξαι.” 
 
Agamemnon’s remarks are prompted by the reversal in Achaean fortunes, which he 
suggests may be attributable to Zeus’ anger. The primary emphasis is on results, 
especially the loss of kudos, and accordingly “this atē” (237) must bear some 
reference to the present situation, as Agamemnon constructs it. At the same time, 
Agamemnon indicates that the reversal in Achaean fortunes also constitutes a reversal 
in Achaean expectations (229-35), and so behind Achaean failure lies an apparently 
misplaced Achaean expectation of success. The general terms in which Agamemnon 
expresses himself conceal an implicit reference to his own deception by Zeus in Book 
2. Ignorant that he has in fact been deceived, Agamemnon himself disingenuously 
presents this scenario in terms of atē in the speech in which he (disastrously) tests his 
troops’ resolve at 2.110-15: 
 
 “ὦ  φίλοι ἥρωες Δαναοὶ θεράποντες Ἄρηος   110 
 Ζεύς με μέγα Κρονίδης ἄτῃ  ἐνέδησε βαρείῃ 
 σχέτλιος, ὃς πρὶν μέν μοι ὑπέσχετο καὶ κατένευσεν 
 Ἴλιον ἐκπέρσαντ’ εὐτείχεον ἀπονέεσθαι, 
 νῦν δὲ κακὴν ἀπάτην βουλεύσατο, καί με κελεύει 
 δυσκλέα Ἄργος ἱκέσθαι, ἐπεὶ πολὺν ὤλεσα λαόν.”  115 
 
11 
Results, as Agamemnon represents them, have been disastrous, but those results also 
betray a miscalculation of the prospects of success, an error brought about by divine 
deception. In the grip of atē, Agamemnon ironically represents himself as in the grip 
of atē; the truth of this is brought home to him by the consequences of his folly, as he 
presents them in Book 8. 
 
Already in these few passages, then, we see that atē and aaō can encompass damage 
both to a person’s fortunes and to his or her mental processes. Atē can refer to a state 
of affairs, but also to a state of mind. Most often, atē as a state of mind is the cause of 
atē as a state of affairs, but an impaired state of mind can also be presented as a 
disastrous consequence rather than as the error that causes disastrous consequences, 
as in the case of the atē that takes hold of Patroclus’ phrenes in Iliad 16 (805-6): 
 
 τὸν δ' ἄτη φρένας εἷλε, λύθεν δ' ὑπὸ  φαίδιμα γυῖα, 
 στῆ  δὲ ταφών· 
 
This is a mental impairment (στῆ  δὲ ταφών, 806),9 and, in so far as it renders 
Patroclus vulnerable to the blows that finally kill him, a cause of ensuing disaster; but 
it is not the disastrous error that sets this whole sequence in motion. Instead, like the 
buckling of the knees in the same context, it is one of the disastrous results of 
Patroclus’ earlier misjudgement, the harmful state of mind that causes him to 
disregard Achilles’ instructions  at 16.684-91: 
                                                 
9
 See Leaf (1900-2) ii.211 on 16.805; cf. Stallmach (1968) 37; Doyle (1984) 7. 
12 
 
 Πάτροκλος δ' ἵπποισι καὶ Αὐτομέδοντι κελεύσας 
 Τρῶας καὶ Λυκίους μετεκίαθε, καὶ μέγ' ἀάσθη  
 685 
 νήπιος· εἰ δὲ ἔπος Πηληϊάδαο φύλαξεν 
 ἦ  τ' ἂν ὑπέκφυγε κῆρα κακὴν μέλανος θανάτοιο. 
 ἀλλ' αἰεί τε Διὸς κρείσσων νόος ἠέ περ ἀνδρῶν· 
 ὅς τε καὶ ἄλκιμον ἄνδρα φοβεῖ καὶ ἀφείλετο νίκην 
 ῥηϊδίως, ὅτε δ' αὐτὸς ἐποτρύνῃσι μάχεσθαι·  
 690 
 ὅς οἱ καὶ τότε θυμὸν ἐνὶ στήθεσσιν ἀνῆκεν. 
 
The fundamental association with the notion of ‘harm’ and the way in which the 
harmful state of mind and the harmful state of affairs are mutually entailed is well 
illustrated in Phoenix’s allegory of the Litai (Il. 9.496-514): 
 
 “ἀλλ' Ἀχιλεῦ δάμασον θυμὸν μέγαν· οὐδέ τί σε χρὴ 
 νηλεὲς ἦτορ ἔχειν· στρεπτοὶ δέ τε καὶ θεοὶ αὐτοί, 
 τῶν περ καὶ μείζων ἀρετὴ  τιμή τε βίη τε. 
13 
 καὶ μὲν τοὺς θυέεσσι καὶ εὐχωλῇς ἀγανῇσι 
 λοιβῇ  τε κνίσῃ  τε παρατρωπῶσ' ἄνθρωποι   
 500 
 λισσόμενοι, ὅτε κέν τις ὑπερβήῃ  καὶ ἁμάρτῃ . 
 καὶ γάρ τε λιταί εἰσι Διὸς κοῦραι μεγάλοιο 
 χωλαί τε ῥυσαί τε παραβλῶπές τ' ὀφθαλμώ, 
 αἵ ῥά τε καὶ μετόπισθ' ἄτης ἀλέγουσι κιοῦσαι. 
 ἣ  δ' ἄτη σθεναρή τε καὶ ἀρτίπος, οὕνεκα πάσας  
 505 
 πολλὸν ὑπεκπροθέει, φθάνει δέ τε πᾶσαν ἐπ' αἶαν 
 βλάπτουσ' ἀνθρώπους· αἳ δ' ἐξακέονται ὀπίσσω. 
 ὃς μέν τ' αἰδέσεται κούρας Διὸς ἆσσον ἰούσας, 
 τὸν δὲ μέγ' ὤνησαν καί τ' ἔκλυον εὐχομένοιο· 
 ὃς δέ κ' ἀνήνηται καί τε στερεῶς ἀποείπῃ ,   
 510 
 λίσσονται δ' ἄρα ταί γε Δία Κρονίωνα κιοῦσαι 
 τῷ  ἄτην ἅμ' ἕπεσθαι, ἵνα βλαφθεὶς ἀποτίσῃ . 
14 
 ἀλλ' Ἀχιλεῦ πόρε καὶ σὺ Διὸς κούρῃσιν ἕπεσθαι 
 τιμήν, ἥ  τ' ἄλλων περ ἐπιγνάμπτει νόον ἐσθλῶν.” 
 
Here, the personified Atē appears twice, first as the cause of the original offence and 
second as a consequence of rejecting reparation. In both cases, it encompasses both 
mental impairment and its disastrous consequences: Agamemnon’s mind was 
impaired when he first insulted Achilles, but that action has now led to disaster; the 
mistake which Achilles would be making if he rejected the Embassy would be as 
disastrous in its consequences as the original offence.
10
 There are two stages of cause 
and effect, with the emphasis first on the subjective aspect and then on the objective: 
the Atē which outruns the Litai is harmful (βλάπτουσ’, 507), both in that it has 
bad consequences that have to be remedied by entreaty and in so far as it is the 
affliction of a man who “transgresses and errs” (ὑπερβήῃ  καὶ ἁμάρτῃ , 501). 
Equally, the point of the warning that it would be a mistake on Achilles’ part to refuse 
the Embassy’s request is that this would be harmful to Achilles – “harmed” 
(βλαφθείς) in 512 points towards the end of the sequence, the disaster to Achilles 
that consists in his having to pay for his mistake (ἀποτίσῃ , ibid.).11 Atē covers both 
                                                 
10
 That this is the point of the allegory seems to me obvious and incontrovertible; I see 
no “obscurity”, pace Adkins (1982) 307. I return to this passage and to this 
understanding of it repeatedly below. 
11
 Those who argue that this passage introduces a ‘new’, ‘moralized’ application of 
atē as punishment for wrongdoing (Müller (1956) 4; Bremer (1969) 107; Saïd (1978) 
15 
the harm that results from a human being’s actions and the harm to his mental 
faculties that causes that outcome in the first place. In the one case we translate it as 
‘delusion’, and in the other ‘disaster’, but though there are contexts in which these 
senses are distinct, it is often very difficult to decide which is in play, and it is normal 
in Homer for each to imply the other – even where the primary reference is to mental 
impairment, this is an impairment that has objectively disastrous consequences, and 
even where it refers to consequences, these are regularly the result of some 
misjudgement.  
 
The following table presents in summary form what I see as the relative frequency of 
cases in which atē refers primarily to the mental impairment that is the cause of 
disaster, those in which it refers primarily to the disaster that typically results from 
mental impairment, and those which are ambivalent or indeterminate (e.g. when the 
relevant term seems to refer more or less equally both to the initial harm of mental 
impairment and to its harmful consequences).
12
 
                                                                                                                                           
89; Yamagata (1991) 9 = (1994) 51) misread the force of the allegory; the atē that is a 
punishment sent by the gods merely mythologizes the potentially disastrous 
consequences of persistence in anger and failure to come to terms. Stallmach (1968) 
58-9 and 88 has it both ways. 
12
 The full list of passages is: cause (noun) Il.1.412; 6.356; 9.115, 504, 505; 10.391; 
16.274; 19.88, 91, 126, 129, 136, 270; 24.28; Od. 4.261; 15.233; 23.223; (verb) Il. 
9.116, 119, 537; 11.340; 16.685; 19.91, 95, 129, 136, 137; Od. 4.503, 509; 21.297, 
301; effect (noun) Il. 8.237; 16.805; 24.480 (see Stallmach (1968) 81-2 and contrast 
Doyle (1984) 17; Finkelberg (1995) 19); Od. 12.372 (see Dodds (1951) 19 n.17; 
16 
 
cause effect ambiguous 
Iliad Odyssey Iliad Odyssey Iliad Odyssey 
noun verb noun verb noun verb noun verb noun verb noun verb 
14 10 3 4 3 2 1 0 3 0 1 3 
 
The overall picture would not be greatly affected by re-assigment of individual cases 
or by greater agnosticism regarding ambiguous examples: the prototypical sense of 
atē in Homer is clearly ‘delusion’. But such delusion must prove disastrous if it is to 
count as a case of atē; in every case the diagnosis of atē is post factum – the delusion 
is postulated on the fact that disaster has occurred.
13
 The only two apparent 
exceptions – where Achilles diagnoses Agamemnon’s atē on the basis of his conduct 
in Book 1 (echoed by Patroclus at 16.270-4) – are not in fact so. Achilles prays that 
Zeus cause the Achaeans to be killed by their ships 
 
   “ἵνα πάντες ἐπαύρωνται βασιλῆος, 
 γνῷ  δὲ καὶ Ἀτρεΐδης εὐρὺ κρείων Ἀγαμέμνων 
 ἣν ἄτην ὅ  τ' ἄριστον Ἀχαιῶν οὐδὲν ἔτισεν.” 
                                                                                                                                           
Doyle (1984) 18; contrast Finkelberg (1995) 19); (verb) Il. 8.237; 19.113; ambiguous 
(noun) Il. 2.111; 9.18, 512; Od. 21.302; (verb) Od. 10.68; 11.61; 21.296. 
13
 Cf. Stallmach (1968) 14, 20-1, 23, 30, 33, 39, 49 n.55 (this is part of the Sinnkern 
des Phänomens), 80; Dawe (1968) 113; Bremer (1969) 103; Saïd (1978) 77-8; Wyatt 
(1982) 260-1; Neuburg (1993) 499; Yamagata (1994) 54 n.30; Scodel (2008) 115. 
17 
     Il. 1.410-12 
 
Achilles is making a prediction with reference to a time in the future when 
Agamemnon will recognize, on the basis of its results, that his treatment of Achilles 
in Book 1 was a big mistake.
14
 Accordingly, though ‘delusion’ is by far the most 
frequent sense of atē in Homer, the sense ‘disaster’ is logically prior. This is the 
fundamental fact that binds Homeric atē closely to the same concept in prose and later 
poetry, including tragedy.
15
  
 
Neither the impairment of one’s judgement nor the impairment of one’s fortunes is 
something a person wants.
16
 To say that one’s action was caused by atē is thus to say, 
once its actual consequences have become clear, that had one known what those 
consequences would be, one would not have acted as one did. This is well brought out 
by Penelope’s observations at Od. 23.218-24:  
 
 “οὐδέ κεν Ἀργείη Ἑλένη, Διὸς ἐκγεγαυῖα, 
 ἀνδρὶ παρ' ἀλλοδαπῷ  ἐμίγη φιλότητι καὶ εὐνῇ , 
 εἰ ᾔδη, ὅ  μιν αὖτις ἀρήϊοι υἷες Ἀχαιῶν    220 
 ἀξέμεναι οἶκόνδε φίλην ἐς πατρίδ' ἔμελλον. 
                                                 
14
 Cf. Stallmach (1968) 57-8. 
15
 For atē in tragedy, see Stallmach (1968); Saïd (1978) 96-142; Doyle (1984) 49-144; 
Padel (1995) 188-96, 204-9, 249-59; Sommerstein (forthcoming). 
16
 Stallmach (1968) 20, 80. 
18 
 τὴν δ' ἦ  τοι ῥέξαι θεὸς ὤρορεν ἔργον ἀεικές· 
 τὴν δ' ἄτην οὐ πρόσθεν ἑῷ  ἐγκάτθετο θυμῷ  
 λυγρήν, ἐξ ἧς πρῶτα καὶ ἡμέας ἵκετο πένθος.” 
 
Helen would not have committed adultery if she had known that she would be 
brought home again. This is why there is a typical connexion between atē and 
regret,
17
 as in the case of Helen’s own evaluation at Od. 4.259-64, in the context of 
her narrative of her encounter with the disguised Odysseus within the walls of Troy. 
By the time Odysseus returned to the Argive camp, he had killed many Trojans. The 
Trojan women lamented, but not Helen: 
 
 “ἔνθ' ἄλλαι Τρῳαὶ λίγ' ἐκώκυον· αὐτὰρ ἐμὸν κῆρ 
 χαῖρ', ἐπεὶ ἤδη μοι κραδίη τέτραπτο νεέσθαι   260 
 ἂψ οἶκόνδ', ἄτην δὲ μετέστενον, ἣν Ἀφροδίτη 
 δῶχ', ὅτε μ' ἤγαγε κεῖσε φίλης ἀπὸ  πατρίδος αἴης,   
 παῖδά τ' ἐμὴν νοσφισσαμένην θάλαμόν τε πόσιν τε 
                                                 
17
 Cf. Wyatt (1982) 260-1; but though the atē–sequence (from error to disaster) 
creates a scenario in which there is ample scope for regret, atē is never regret as such, 
and so there is no room for Wyatt’s hypothesis that atē originally denoted a feeling of 
regret focusing on over-indulgence in food and drink. For more on atē and regret, see 
below. 
19 
 οὔ τευ δευόμενον, οὔτ' ἂρ φρένας οὔτε τι εἶδος.” 
 
Helen’s reference to her (god-sent) atē is motivated by the desire to repudiate her 
actions before an audience that includes Menelaus, but it is also clear that the change 
of heart and the regret of which she wants to persuade her listeners were motivated by 
her recognition – given that the disguised Odysseus had told her “the whole purpose 
of the Achaeans” (256) – that she might soon have to face the unfortunate 
consequences of her actions.
18
 
 
These two passages raise a number of issues. For both Helen and Penelope the result 
of Helen’s action in eloping with Paris indicates that she could not have been 
deliberating clearly when she took the decision to leave – she must have been subject 
to atē. Both, moreover, trace the ultimate source of that atē not to Helen’s character, 
but to a god. The reasoning in both cases has the same outline: given that Helen’s 
situation in Sparta was an enviable one, and given that her actions would one day 
catch up with her, she must have been deranged to run away with Paris; only divine 
influence can explain a decision that, with hindsight, looks so inexplicable. But within 
                                                 
18
 The sincerity of this regret is famously questioned by Menelaus’ ensuing tale 
(4.274-84) of how Helen subsequently sought to expose the Achaeans’ stratagem. The 
genuineness of her change of heart thus remains moot; but still the construction that 
she wishes her audience to accept is of regret for an action whose consequences have 
proved to be negative. Though Menelaus undercuts that representation, he tactfully 
attributes Helen’s pro-Trojan actions to divine influence (274-5), just as she herself 
had attributed her initial error to Aphrodite (261-2). 
20 
that outline the two evaluations diverge. Helen’s purpose is to flatter Menelaus – it 
was an aberration to leave a man like him. But Penelope’s aim is to explain to 
Odysseus that it was her very desire not to end up like Helen that made her reluctant 
to believe that he had actually returned. In Helen’s construction, any blame that she 
might incur is implicit; in Penelope’s, though it was a god that caused Helen to act 
‘out of character’, still her action was aeikes, a cause of great suffering to others as 
well as to herself, and something that she “put in her own mind”; and the implication 
remains that Helen herself was ready to commit such an action because she failed to 
reflect on either its consequences or its character.
19
 
 
Helen and Penelope attribute Helen’s atē to an external cause, i.e. divine influence. 
This is common, but not invariable: there are 14 clear cases in which the noun atē is 
used of a scenario in which divine influence is at work, and 9 in which the same is 
true of the verb. This leaves 8 cases of the noun and 7 of the verb in which the source 
of atē seems to lie within the individual. Dodds alleges (1951: 5) that where the agent 
of atē is identified, that agent is a supernatural one, and concludes that supernatural 
origin is to be supplied even where it is not specified.
20
 In some cases one might be 
                                                 
19
 For more on these evaluations of Helen’s conduct, see below. 
20
 Dodds is aware that his generalization does not in fact hold, but buries the 
concession in an endnote (1951: 19 n.20). Similarly Stallmach regards divine 
causation as fundamental or essential to atē (1968: 39-40, 47, 84-92, 99, 102), despite 
his recognition of cases with non-divine origins (in oneself, in the actions of others, in 
forces such as sleep and wine) at pp.45-8. Views similar to Dodds’s are expressed in 
Bremer (1969) 104, 107, 111, 114; Wyatt (1982) 262; Doyle (1984) 16; and (with 
qualifications) Williams (1993) 53. Stallmach’s tendency to privilege external divine 
21 
tempted to go down that road, for example in the case of Helen’s reference to Paris’ 
atē at Il. 6.355-621  – not on the grounds that Zeus is said to be responsible for the 
couple’s fate in the next line, but because the ultimate source of the atē could be seen, 
as in Helen’s own case in the Odyssey, as Aphrodite. The same may, but need not, be 
true also of the later instance at 24.28-30, where Aphrodite is said to excite Paris’ lust, 
but the atē seems to lie in his own decision to act on that as opposed to other 
                                                                                                                                           
origins in spite of acknowledging cases of non-divine sources (both exogenous and 
endogenous) is shared by Saïd (1978) 80-2, 95. For the divine origin as merely an 
“option”, cf. Padel (1995) 183-4. 
21
 Il. 6.354-8: 
 “ἀλλ' ἄγε νῦν εἴσελθε καὶ ἕζεο τῷδ' ἐπὶ δίφρῳ  
 δᾶερ, ἐπεί σε μάλιστα πόνος φρένας ἀμφιβέβηκεν 
 εἵνεκ' ἐμεῖο κυνὸς καὶ Ἀλεξάνδρου ἕνεκ' ἄτης,   
 οἷσιν ἐπὶ Ζεὺς θῆκε κακὸν μόρον, ὡς καὶ ὀπίσσω 
 ἀνθρώποισι πελώμεθ' ἀοίδιμοι ἐσσομένοισι.” 
22 
motives.
22
 But in other cases it would be wrong to make this assumption. The crucial 
point is that gods are in fact not the only specified agents of atē – there are examples 
in which the source of atē is external, but not divine. We have already considered the 
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 24.28-30: 
 [Hera, Poseidon, and Athena] ἔχον ὥς σφιν πρῶτον ἀπήχθετο Ἴλιος 
ἱρὴ  
 καὶ Πρίαμος καὶ λαὸς Ἀλεξάνδρου ἕνεκ' ἄτης, 
  ὃς νείκεσσε θεὰ ς ὅτε οἱ μέσσαυλον ἵκοντο, 
 τὴν δ' ᾔνησ' ἥ  οἱ πόρε μαχλοσύνην ἀλεγεινήν. 
On the text in both these passages (and at 3.100, where editors generally prefer 
Ἀλεξάνδρου ἕνεκ' ἄρχης, the alternative in all three places), see Cauer (1921) 
69-70; Stallmach (1968) 96; Müller (1956) 3; Kirk (1985) 277 on 3.100; (1990) 207 
on 6.356; Richardson (1993) 279 on 24.28. The variants are ancient, and it is difficult 
to choose between them: though it can be argued that ἄρχης is motivated by an 
erroneous assumption that ἄτης would imply exculpation (cf. Σ A on Il. 3.100; Σ T 
on 24.28), it is also possible that ἄτης arose from a failure fully to appreciate that, in 
an ethic of reciprocity, ‘starting it’ presupposes blame (as at Il. 3.298–9, 351–5; 
4.235–9, 269–71; 9.34; 24.369; cf. Allan and Cairns (2011) 143 n.57). The thematic 
importance of atē in the Iliadic fabula as a whole (see below) is perhaps slightly in 
favour of ἄτης. 
23 
cases of wine (Od. 11.61-5, 21.293-304) and sleep (Od. 10.68-9, 12.371-3); 
admittedly, at Od. 12.371-3 sleep is caused by the gods, and in both sleep is quasi-
personified (schetlios, nēleēs); and of course Hypnos can be a fully personified divine 
agent. Similarly, Dodds (ibid.) argues that the instances of wine as the cause of atē 
indicate not that atē may have everyday, non-supernatural causes, but that “wine has 
something supernatural or demonic about it”. But this will not work. Elpenor may be 
trying to shift the responsibility for his drunkenness on to a daimōn, but the daimōn 
and the wine are two distinct factors; and in Antinous’ exemplum the harm that is 
caused by the wine is reformulated (in 21.297) as harm that Eurytion caused to 
himself by means of wine; though an exogenous cause of atē, like a god, wine may 
also be an instrument of endogenous atē – Eurytion is explicitly said not only to have 
“harmed his wits with wine” but to have “caused evil to himself” (21.304) – wine is 
certainly not a supernatural agent here. If that is not enough, conclusive proof that the 
agent of atē need not be supernatural is provided by two cases in which other human 
beings are its cause – Hector, whose inducements seem to Dolon (now that he has 
been captured) to have impaired his better judgement (Il. 10.391),
23
 and the 
companions of Odysseus, who are the primary cause of the disaster that resulted when 
he feel asleep and they opened the bag of winds (Od. 10.68).  
 
                                                 
23
 Il. 10.391-3: 
 “πολλῇσίν μ' ἄτῃσι παρὲκ νόον ἤγαγεν Ἕκτωρ, 
 ὅς μοι Πηλεΐωνος ἀγαυοῦ μώνυχας ἵππους 
 δωσέμεναι κατένευσε κτλ.” 
24 
Sometimes the external agent is Atē herself. This personification reaches its fullest 
development in the allegory of the Litai and in Agamemnon’s apology in Iliad 19. 
These are ad hoc inventions tied to very particular persuasive strategies, but they are 
not wholly isolated: they simply take to a higher level something that is a fundamental 
feature of the concept’s phenomenology, namely the sense that atē is something that 
‘comes over’ a person from outside. We see this, for example, in the way that atē 
“took Patroclus’ phrenes” at Il. 16.805 (τὸν δ' ἄτη φρένας εἷλε) and “seizes” the 
homicide in the simile of Il. 24.480 (ὡς δ' ὅτ' ἂν ἄνδρ' ἄτη πυκινὴ  λάβῃ), or 
in the way that Agamemnon twice describes himself as having been bound by Zeus in 
atē (Il. 2.111 and 9.18: Ζεύς με μέγα Κρονίδης ἄτῃ  ἐνέδησε βαρείῃ); but it is 
there even in the prevalence of the passive (and middle for passive) in the usage of the 
verb (14 of 19 instances); the harm that is atē is something that one feels happens or is 
done to one.
24
 This is a very general phenomenon, common to a whole range of 
psychic events, especially those that later Greeks called pathē and we call emotions. 
But what does it amount to in this case? “I was harmed” and “my phrenes were 
harmed” imply an agent or instrument, but not necessarily one genuinely external to 
the agent. If atē can seize a person, so can (e.g.) achos, aidōs, deos, phobos (i.e. the 
                                                 
24
 Cf. Stallmach (1968) 80, 84-5; Dawe (1968) 98; Bremer (1969) 102; Saïd (1978) 
80, 86-7; Francis (1983) 91-2, 117-18 n.68. The view of Seiler (1954) that the active 
and passive senses of the verb as ‘harm’ and ‘be harmed’ are secondary developments 
from an original reflexive sense, ‘to act in error’, expressed esp. in the aor. med. (cf. 
n.4 above), seems to me entirely arbitrary, motivated solely by a desire to explain the 
prototypical Homeric sense as chronologically prior.  
25 
impulse to flee), and cholos – these are personifiable, of course, but not by any means 
invariably regarded as genuine, quasi-demonic, external agents.
25
 
 
In Agamemnon’s Apology, it is Zeus, Moira, and the Erinys that send Agamemnon’s 
atē, but the speech also employs an elaborate para-narrative in which Agamemnon 
presents Zeus himself as a fellow sufferer (Il. 19.85-138). The external agent of Zeus’ 
atē is none other than Atē herself; but if it is only for the purposes of this argument 
(and its companion in Book 9) that Atē is actually a goddess, to say that one’s atē was 
caused by Atē is simply to say that it happened.26 The real cause of Zeus’ atē, the 
blindness in which he swears the oath, is Hera, who deceives him. Deception, to be 
sure, has its source in an external agent, but it is not compulsive – whether one falls 
for it or not depends on how careful, alert, or sceptical one is at the time.
27
 
                                                 
25
 Cf. e.g. aidōs Il. 15.657; achos Il. 14.475; 16, 599; Od. 21.412; deos Il. 4.421; 
5.812, 817; 7.479; 8.77; 13.224; 14.387; 15.657-8; 17.67; Od. 6.140; 11.43, 633; 
12.243; 22.42; 24.450, 533; phobos Il. 11.402; 13.470; cholos Il. 1.387; 4.23; 8.460; 
16.30; 18.322; 20.255; Od. 8.304. 
26
 This remains true regardless of the appearance of the personified atē in other 
contexts, e.g. Hes. Th. 224-30; see further Stallmach (1968) 85-92, esp. p.90: “Nach 
all dem muß man sagen, daß die Gestalt des Daimon Ate ohne feste Umrisse bleibt.” 
Stallmach thus anticipated Dodds (1951) 5: “the two passages which speak of ate in 
personal terms ... are transparent pieces of allegory”. 
27
 On the links between atē and apatē, see esp. Il. 2.111-15; 9.18-22; 10.391-9; 19. 
95-7. At Hes. Th. 224-30 Atē is Apatē’s niece. Cf. Stallmach (1968) 40, 44-5; Dodds 
(1951) 39; Seiler (1954) 416; Mette (1955) 7; Dawe (1968) 100-1; Wyatt (1982) 251; 
26 
Agamemnon’s case, as he represents it, resembles Zeus’ only by means of the 
metaphor of a goddess called Atē; in Zeus’ case the metaphor means no more than 
that on one occasion he let something happen that he would normally have taken steps 
to prevent, because he was deceived by his wife.
28
 Agamemnon argues for genuine 
external (divine) influence in his own case; but his exemplum, de-allegorized, 
indicates that another model is possible. Equally, if we de-allegorize the parable of the 
Litai in Book 9 (496-514), the atē that initially affected Agamemnon and that which 
Phoenix suggests will affect Achilles if he rejects the Embassy are both endogenous. 
First, the entreaties that Phoenix and the others make on Agamemnon’s behalf are 
compared to the prayers to the gods made by human beings who “transgress and err” 
(ὅτε κέν τις ὑπερβήῃ  καὶ ἁμάρτῃ , 501).29 Then, after the allegory, Phoenix 
proceeds to argue that, in his opinion, the situation would be different if Agamemnon 
were still acting as provocatively as he did in Book 1 (515-20); in that case, Achilles’ 
persistence in anger would be justified – but now that Agamemnon has offered to 
make amends, it no longer is (523):   
 
                                                                                                                                           
Francis (1983) 81, 108 n.12; Padel (1995) 170, 176, 183, 189. On the influence of 
popular etymology on the semantics and usage of atē, cf. below, nn.101-2. 
28
 The discrepancy is noticed, in support of very different conclusions, in Müller 
(1956) 4. 
29
 It is only in the vehicle of the image that these ‘transgressions’ are due to the 
intervention of a goddess called Atē (contrast Saïd (1978) 93, 132); in the tenor, 
trangression and hamartia are ways of describing the process of atē itself. 
27 
 “εἰ μὲν γὰρ μὴ δῶρα φέροι τὰ  δ' ὄπισθ' ὀνομάζοι   
 515 
 Ἀτρεΐδης, ἀλλ' αἰὲν ἐπιζαφελῶς χαλεπαίνοι, 
 οὐκ ἂν ἔγωγέ σε μῆνιν ἀπορρίψαντα κελοίμην 
 Ἀργείοισιν ἀμυνέμεναι χατέουσί περ ἔμπης· 
 νῦν δ' ἅμα τ' αὐτίκα πολλὰ  διδοῖ τὰ  δ' ὄπισθεν ὑπέστη, 
 ἄνδρας δὲ λίσσεσθαι ἐπιπροέηκεν ἀρίστους  
 520 
 κρινάμενος κατὰ  λαὸν Ἀχαιϊκόν, οἵ τε σοὶ αὐτῷ  
 φίλτατοι Ἀργείων· τῶν μὴ  σύ γε μῦθον ἐλέγξῃς 
 μηδὲ πόδας· πρὶν δ' οὔ τι νεμεσσητὸν κεχολῶσθαι.” 
 
Phoenix’s argument requires the retention of the regular relation between offence, 
anger, and reparation – both the anger and the reparation accept that the true origin of 
the offence lies in the offender. Equally, the point of the warning (that if the Litai are 
rejected, they will beg Zeus to send Atē against the man who offended them) is that 
Achilles, if he rejects the embassy, will be making a mistake with potentially 
disastrous consequences; and this mistake itself would (according to Phoenix) make 
Achilles a legitimate object of censure (523). We notice that even in allegorical terms, 
Zeus sends Atē only after the person in question has rejected the Litai. This does not 
28 
mean that if Achilles rejects the Embassy he will, at some point in the future, make 
another mistake with disastrous consequences. Rejecting the Embassy is itself atē,30 
but it is revealing that even in the allegory the motivation for the crucial mistake 
comes from within the agent himself. If we think about it, it could not be otherwise, 
given that Phoenix’s aim is precisely to prevent Achilles from making a mistake 
which it is in Achilles’ power to avoid.31 
 
The phenomenological passivity of atē, together with its quasi-personification, full 
personification, and attribution to various external agents, all belong with what Dodds 
(anticipated by Stallmach) rightly saw as its main purpose: to explain how the actions 
of people who are capable of deliberating well sometimes produce disastrous results. 
Atē has an intrinsic connexion with agency and causality – it explains not just how 
this could have happened to X, but how X could have performed the action that 
caused this to happen to him.
32
 Thus the regret with which atē is typically associated 
is a form of what Bernard Williams calls agent-regret.
33
 In that regard, atē bears an 
interesting relation to what psychologists call the Fundamental Attribution Error, the 
phenomenon by which we tend to regard others’ behaviour (especially their faults) as 
deliberate, typical, and expressive of their overall character (in contrast to our own 
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 See Eustathius on Il. 19.94, cited by Bremer (1969) 107 n.24, and cf. below [000]. 
31
 Thus, in effect, Phoenix’s argument is an allegorized version of the earlier warning 
given by the first speaker, Odysseus, that, if Achilles rejects the ambassadors’ 
appeals, he will come to regret it (9.249-51; cf. below, 000-000 [c. n.68]). 
32
 See esp. Stallmach (1968) 8; Dodds (1951) 5-6, 13-14. 
33
 See Williams (1981); cf. Williams (1993) 69-70. 
29 
faults, which we tend to regard as isolated, atypical, and situationally conditioned).
34
 
Appeal to atē can be a way of forestalling the kind of whole person judgment that 
others will tend to make of oneself; by the same token, it can reflect an agent’s own 
bias regarding the disjunction between her unfortunate actions and her overall good 
character. Atē may thus imply the kind of distinction between the evaluation of 
actions and of agents that finds expression in Aristotle’s account of the difference 
between misfortunes (atychēmata), errors (hamartēmata), particular unjust actions 
(adikēmata), and being an unjust person.35 Similar criteria underpin Gabriele Taylor’s 
much more recent account of the differences between remorse, guilt, and shame in 
terms of their focus on actions alone, on actions as expressive of character, or on the 
whole self.
36
 As a means of dissociating one’s ill-advised actions from the overall 
image of the kind of person one wishes to be taken to be, atē presupposes at least 
regret, and might conceivably occur in scenarios which Taylor’s schema would 
categorize under the heading of remorse. It remains to be seen, however, whether atē 
always relies on a distinction between an agent’s character and his or her actions, and 
how far it is a factor that diminishes or reinforces the culpability of either actions or 
agents. 
 
                                                 
34
 The term was coined by Ross (1977), after Jones and Harris (1967). As far as the 
asymmetry between first-person and third-person evaluations is concerned, cf. the 
‘actor-observer’ bias proposed by Jones and Nisbett (1971). 
35
 See EN 1135a5-1136a5; cf. Rhet. 1368b9-12, 1373b33-8, 1374a9-13, b2-16; also 
Finkelberg (1995) 27. 
36
 Taylor (1985) 97-107. 
30 
In Homer, it seems that causal responsibility, at least of a contributory nature, is 
necessary for atē. But culpability is another matter. In this regard, a salient fact about 
the use of atē and aaō in Homer is that they are much more common in speech than in 
narrative.
37
 The instances in the narrative certainly show that the poems’ narrators do 
believe in atē; the Odyssey narrator also believes that it may have divine origins – he 
attributes Melampus’ atē to an Erinys (15.233). None of these cases is wholly 
exculpatory; one, indeed, is strongly condemnatory (Il. 24.28), though this is no doubt 
embedded focalization (representing the point of view of the three divinities whose 
hostility to Troy has just been mentioned). In the vast majority of cases, however, we 
are dealing with the evaluations of speakers, all of which must be interpreted in the 
light of the particular speaker’s motives in the specific context.  
 
One obvious factor is whether a speaker is evaluating his or her own conduct or 
someone else’s. In the Odyssey a clear distinction is visible between first- and third-
person reference in the usage of the verb: all five cases in which the speaker uses the 
verb to refer to a another party’s behaviour are clearly condemnatory, while both 
instances of the verb with reference to the speaker’s own conduct are clearly 
exculpatory. Odysseus’ presentation of himself as a victim of atē (“ἄασάν μ' 
ἕταροί τε κακοὶ πρὸς τοῖσί τε ὕπνος”, Odyssey 10.68) shifts blame as much 
as possible – not he, but his companions and sleep were responsible for his 
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 Noun x17 = 85%, verb x10 = 83% Il.; noun x4 = 80% , verb x7 = 100% Od.; 
average 88%. The occurrences in the narrative are: (noun) Il. 16.805; 24.28, 480, Od. 
15.233; (verb) Il. 11.340; 16.685. 
31 
misfortune.
38
 Just so, Elpenor makes fate and wine substantially responsible for his 
own death (“ἆσέ με δαίμονος αἶσα κακὴ  καὶ ἀθέσφατος οἶνος”, 11.61). 
On the other hand, Antinous makes Eurytion fully the author of his own misfortunes 
(especially 21.297: ὁ  δ' ἐπεὶ φρένας ἄασεν οἴνῳ ). Similarly, Menelaus makes it 
clear that Locrian Ajax’s atē was reprehensible – the word he spoke under its 
influence and which led to his ruin was hyperphialon (4.503). Antinous’ castigation 
of the atē of Eurytion also has one clearly condemnatory use of the noun (21.302). In 
a second instance (of four in which the noun occurs in speech) the reference is first-
person, and clearly exculpatory – the atē in question is the result of Odysseus’ 
companions killing and eating the cattle of Helios, but a contributory factor was the 
mental impairment, i.e. sleep, on Odysseus’ part that allowed them to do so; and this 
Odysseus attributes wholly to the gods (12.371-3). In the other two, the issue is the 
atē of Helen, first in Helen’s own words and then in those of Penelope (Od. 4.259-64, 
23.218-24, both quoted above). If Helen does not, perhaps, wholly exculpate herself 
(her ‘regret’ – μετέστενον, 261 – is nicely ambiguous), she does, at least, clearly 
dissociate herself from the creature who ran off with Paris.
39
 On the face of it, her 
evaluation is shared by Penelope in the second passage – only atē could have made 
her do it, and this atē came from the gods. Yet in Penelope’s version the deed is 
condemned as aeikes, and part of Helen’s atē was her failure to realize that she might 
one day be brought back to Greece. This failure contrasts strongly with the 
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 Cf. Scodel (2008) 116-17. 
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characteristic of which Penelope wants to assure Odysseus in this passage – her 
conviction that Odysseus would return and her determination to ensure that he would 
have nothing to reproach her for when he did. This, she says, explains her caution 
when confronted with a man claiming to be her husband – it would be too easy to fall 
into that delusion. So if the purpose of Helen’s reference to atē was to dissociate 
herself from her past actions, Penelope’s purpose is to dissociate herself from Helen.40 
And while Penelope is careful to avoid open censure, this is none the less implicit 
condemnation – Penelope believes herself capable of something that Helen was not, 
namely fidelity to her husband, despite the temptations which might (were she not 
more careful than Helen) lead her into error. Though more complex, these two 
passages broadly confirm the Odyssean split between first-person and third-person 
perspectives – the third-person case is certainly more condemnatory than the first-
person one.  
 
We see examples of the same sort of thing in the Iliad – first-person exculpation in 
Dolon’s claim that Hector led him astray (10.391) and, famously, in Agamemnon’s 
Apology; third-person condemnation in Achilles’ and Patroclus’ references to 
Agamemnon’s atē (1.412, 16.274) and in Helen’s bitter denunciation of Paris’ 
(6.356). But the Odyssean pattern is not maintained. One reason for this is that 
Agamemnon’s self-exculpatory monologue in Book 19 includes a mythological 
narrative to show that even Zeus was helpless in the face of atē; this embeds a number 
of exculpatory third-person references in an equally exculpatory first-person account. 
Then there is the simple truth that, though first-person evaluations tend to be less 
harsh than third-person, it is entirely possible both for speakers to criticize their own 
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actions as harshly or more harshly than others would and for third parties to offer the 
kinds of excuse that one might advance on one’s own behalf. But a more fundamental 
reason is that the nuances of blame and excuse that we saw in the two Odyssean 
references to Helen’s atē are even more subtly exploited in the Iliad.  
 
Atē can be used to exculpate, excuse, or mitigate because it facilitates a distinction 
between a person’s enduring character and a single sequence of action that can be 
represented as the result of a temporary, aberrant state of mind (one that may, but 
need not, be externally induced). But it does not always do so.
41
 At Il. 1.244, Achilles 
predicts that Agamemnon will “tear his thymos in anguish that he paid no honour to 
the best of the Achaeans”; he reformulates this at 1.412 by saying that Agamemnon 
“will recognize his atē in failing to pay honour to the best of the Achaeans” (repeated 
by Patroclus at 16.274). Both these passages mean no more than that Agamemnon 
will regret his action when its consequences become obvious.
42
 The failure to honour 
the best of the Achaeans is the offence that Achilles designates as anaideiē (1.149, 
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 Cf. Stallmach (1968) 57; Lesky (2001) 198. 
34 
158, 9.372) and hybris (1.203, 9.367-9).
43
 In using these terms, Achilles means to 
present Agamemnon’s offence both as deliberate wrongdoing and as typical of 
Agamemnon as a person. Anaideiē is a matter of character as well as behaviour; 
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 Cf. descriptions of Agamemnon’s act as ‘just taking’ (1.137-8, 161, 184-7, 324-5, 
355-6, 506-7; 2.239-40; 9.106-11; 19.88-9), with Allan and Cairns (2011) 115 (cf. 
139 nn.8, 14, 143 n.57). For Doyle (1984: 12-13) “What seems particularly 
noteworthy in [Il. 1.411-12 and 16.273-4] is the singular failure of both Achilles and 
Patroclus to accuse Agamemnon of any guilt. Their preoccupation is totally 
otherwise: they are concerned with the lack of τιμή, and with the consequent shame, 
which Agamemnon’s ἄτη brings on Achilles.” Finkelberg (1995: 16-17) goes even 
further in arguing that it is “characteristic” of atē that “the agent is not recognized 
either by himself or by others as an autonomous causer of what he has done” (cf. 27, 
alleging that agents are not held responsible for actions done under the influence of 
wine, in so far as these are due to atē; but see Od. 21.304, discussed in the text 
above). Her account relies on a claim (1995: 19) that agents (such as Agamemnon and 
Helen) may be “blamed by themselves and others for their deeds” yet “not seen as 
responsible for their consequences” that seems to me incoherent. That atē always 
exculpates is implicit also in Wilson (2002), esp. 76, 117-18; an apparent statement to 
the contrary, that in his reference to his atai at Il. 9.115-20 “Agamemnon accepts 
responsibility” (2002: 76), is shown by its immediate sequel (“without accepting 
liability, or culpability”) to be a simple confusion of the accepted senses of the terms 
‘responsibility’ and ‘liability’. On the notion that atē reflects a Homeric focus on 
strict liability rather than responsibility, results rather than intentions, cf. n.54 below. 
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though it issues in acts, it is itself a disposition. And hybris is a way of deliberately 
dishonouring another person that typically springs from an arrogant sense of one’s 
own superiority.
44
 Agamemnon has certainly deliberately dishonoured Achilles; part 
of his motivation in doing so, moreover, is precisely to demonstrate his own 
superiority (by his own admission at 1.184-7). Athena’s endorsement of Achilles’ 
charge of hybris (1.213-14) is wholly warranted. Qua hybris, then, Agamemnon’s 
dishonouring of Achilles is deliberate and intentional; qua atē it is something he does 
in ignorance of the consequences. There is no contradiction: Agamemnon intends to 
dishonour Achilles, but is wrong to imagine that he can do so without harm or loss to 
himself. Achilles and Patroclus condemn him both for the hybris and for the error. In 
this case, atē does not exculpate or mitigate, but rather picks out a significant criterion 
for blame – thinking that you can do what you like because you think you can get 
away with it is part of the essence of the offence itself. In calling Agamemnon’s 
action atē Achilles does not intend to hand his adversary an opportunity to claim, at a 
later point, that his action was ‘out of character’; rather Achilles represents it as 
typical.
45
 The point is not that atē always distinguishes the act from the agent’s settled 
character, but that it always refers to a single sequence of cause, action, and effect, not 
to character as such. A character can be prone to atē (as Agamemnon in fact is – no 
fewer than 11 of the Iliad’s 20 instances of the noun and 8 of its 12 instances of the 
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verb refer to or are spoken by him);
46
 but atē as such refers to a single disastrous 
mistake.  
 
The ‘apologetic’ function of atē comes to the fore in the later stages of the quarrel. 
After a disastrous performance in open assembly (in which he also speaks of his atē, 
9.18), Agamemnon is ushered away by Nestor, only to be given a dressing-down for 
disregarding the rest of the army, ignoring good advice, taking by force and arbitrary 
fiat a prize legitimately awarded, and thereby dishonouring a man whom even the 
gods honour (9.106-11): 
 
  “... ὅτε διογενὲς Βρισηΐδα κούρην 
 χωομένου Ἀχιλῆος ἔβης κλισίηθεν ἀπούρας 
 οὔ τι καθ' ἡμέτερόν γε νόον· μάλα γάρ τοι ἔγωγε 
 πόλλ' ἀπεμυθεόμην· σὺ δὲ σῷ  μεγαλήτορι θυμῷ  
 εἴξας ἄνδρα φέριστον, ὃν ἀθάνατοί περ ἔτισαν,  
 110 
 ἠτίμησας, ἑλὼν γὰρ ἔχεις γέρας.” 
 
Nestor’s charges echo Achilles’ own complaints; and Agamemnon accepts them: 
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 “ὦ  γέρον οὔ τι ψεῦδος ἐμὰ ς ἄτας κατέλεξας·  
 115 
  ἀασάμην, οὐδ' αὐτὸς ἀναίνομαι. ἀντί νυ πολλῶν 
 λαῶν ἐστὶν ἀνὴρ ὅν τε Ζεὺς κῆρι φιλήσῃ , 
 ὡς νῦν τοῦτον ἔτισε, δάμασσε δὲ λαὸν Ἀχαιῶν. 
  ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ ἀασάμην φρεσὶ λευγαλέῃσι πιθήσας, 
 ἂψ ἐθέλω ἀρέσαι δόμεναί τ' ἀπερείσι' ἄποινα.”  
 120 
 
Achilles is honoured by Zeus, and so (Agamemnon now recognizes, in contrast to his 
attitude in Book 1) of indispensable value to the Achaean army (116-18). 
Agamemnon’s offer to make amends (120) further accepts that he was in the wrong.47 
His offence was atē – indeed it was a catalogue of atai (οὔ τι ψεῦδος ἐμὰ ς ἄτας 
κατέλεξας 115). It is the atē as such that demands the reparation (119-20), and not 
only does Agamemnon accept full and sole responsibility for this atē (in succumbing 
to it he was persuaded by his own “baneful wits”, 119), he also accepts that it makes 
him a legitimate target of blame – “not even I deny it” (115-16) – if atē were to 
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 On the importance of this point, see Donlan (1993) 161; Scodel (2008) 102-3; 
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exculpate, the question of denial would not even arise.
48
 There is indeed an element of 
self-distancing in Agamemnon’s response – now that his act has proved disastrous, he 
regards it as an aberration, something that is not a feature of his settled character – but 
there is no evasion of either blame or responsibility; Agamemnon is chastened by 
Nestor’s criticism, and accepts that it is valid. His confession of a catalogue of atai, 
though it may well involve a sardonic reference to the force of Nestor’s criticism, is in 
fact relatively strong self-reproach. 
 
Phoenix also presents Agamemnon’s offer as a recognition of fault in his allegory of 
the Litai. Again, a basic point to remember is that a man who offers recompense 
accepts that he has caused an offence that he must now make good. When Phoenix 
presents the Embassy as the work of Litai, he confirms this: entreaty is the act of a 
person who “transgresses and errs” (501); and anger at such a person is justified 
(523). The element of tact in Phoenix’s presentation lies first in the fact that atē in this 
case makes the act venial – Agamemnon has recognized and repudiated a one-off 
mistake that is not a true reflection of his character – and second in the way that the 
personification of both Atē and the Litai generalizes the quarrel and avoids specific 
reference to Agamemnon. This is the kind of self-distancing that needs to be present 
in any effective form of apology: we do not accept amends from people who say “I 
meant it, I stand by it, and I’d do it again” – anyone who wishes to make amends and 
thereby to repair a relationship has to look both to the past (the offence was his, but 
not the sort of thing that he habitually does) and to the future (because the offence 
was an aberration there is reason to believe that the offender and the victim will be 
able to co-operate once more); in both directions the agent has to present him- or 
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herself as a responsible one, capable of reliable co-operation.
49
 This, moreover, is the 
kind of construction that Achilles needs to accept if the quarrel is to end – 
Agamemnon must be allowed to retain some face if the two are ever to co-operate 
again.
50
  
 
Things have changed by Book 19. Achilles has decided to return to battle for his own 
reasons and in his eagerness to re-enter the fray has virtually shared the blame for 
what he represents as a trivial dispute with disastrous consequences, something that 
should never have happened.
51
 Agamemnon, therefore, no longer needs to be 
particularly contrite; but he has been wounded, and his authority risks being 
undermined by the boost to morale given by Achilles’ return and the widespread 
criticism of his own conduct that he refers to at the beginning of his speech. Therefore 
he uses atē to maximize the distance between himself and his act in dishonouring 
Achilles – everyone is blaming him, he says, but he is not to blame. Atē is irresistible, 
and affects even Zeus. (But still he will make amends.)
52
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 NB the dissonance between the imperfect logic of 19.137-8 (“since Zeus took away 
my wits, I am willing to make amends”) and the logical sequence of 9.119-20 (“since 
I trusted in my baneful wits, I am willing to make amends”), and cf. Taplin (1992) 
207-9; Cairns (2011) [000]. There is a similar dissonance between Agamemnon’s 
claim that his atē exculpates at 19.85-9 and his use in line 89 of a phrase (Ἀχιλλῆος 
40 
 
Achilles accepts Agamemnon’s self-exculpation (270-4, quoted and discussed below), 
but Odysseus does not. Instead, he issues a firm warning that Agamemnon, who 
started the quarrel, must be more just in future (19.181-3):  
 
 “Ἀτρεΐδη σὺ δ' ἔπειτα δικαιότερος καὶ ἐπ' ἄλλῳ    
 ἔσσεαι. οὐ μὲν γάρ τι νεμεσσητὸν βασιλῆα 
 ἄνδρ' ἀπαρέσσασθαι ὅτε τις πρότερος χαλεπήνῃ .” 
 
This is clearly incompatible with Agamemnon’s explanation, for such a warning can 
focus only on what is in the agent’s power.53 Odysseus insists that Agamemnon must 
acknowledge his fault (that he started the quarrel) and implies moreover that the 
sensitivity to popular disapproval which motivated Agamemnon’s attempt to save 
face (85-6) is misplaced when gratuitous offence has been given and reparation is 
called for.  
 
                                                                                                                                           
γέρας αὐτὸς ἀπηύρων) of a type that is elsewhere used to condemn his 
gratuitous offence (see 1.137-8, 161, 184-7, 324-5, 355-6, 506-7; 2.239-40; 9.107; 
16.58, with Teffeteller (1990); cf. Scodel (2003) 276-8; Allan and Cairns (2011) 115). 
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 Cf. Cairns (2001b) 18 n.54; contrast Stallmach (1968) 34-5, who notes only 
Achilles’ endorsement at 270-4; so also Erbse (1984) 212.  
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Discussions of atē as an exhibit in the historiography of ideas typically start from 
Agamemnon’s ‘Apology’, which is often used to ‘prove’ that the Iliad lacks a 
‘satisfactory’ notion of ‘moral responsibility’, restricting itself to a focus on strict 
liability, because this is a world in which results matter much more than intentions.
54
 
To use this passage as a paradigm, however, is to look through the wrong end of the 
telescope.
55
 Agamemnon gives us only a partial interpretation that is contradicted in 
context and that contrasts with other (partial) explanations given elsewhere. The 
important lesson of Agamemnon’s Apology is not that the Homeric notion of 
responsibility is exotic and undeveloped,
56
 but that the notion of atē is open to 
rhetorical manipulation to suit a speaker’s aims in context, and that its implications in 
terms of characters’ responsibility for their actions are not a matter of fixed 
orthodoxy. As evidence for the Homeric conception of responsible human action 
Agamemnon’s Apology, and indeed the presentation of atē in Homer in general, 
demonstrate quite the opposite of what is commonly supposed. Though, as an account 
of the operation of atē, Agamemnon’s Apology is idiosyncratic in several respects, it 
resembles a large number of other passages in advancing atē as an explanation for 
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exceptional behaviour.
57
 Agamemnon is not arguing that he is never responsible 
(much less that no one is ever responsible), but that in this situation, in which others 
are blaming him as the cause (aitios) of their misfortunes, there are special 
circumstances which mean that he should not be blamed. Agamemnon adopts this 
tactic precisely because he knows that he is likely to be held to account for past 
actions and that he needs to present himself as someone whom Achilles and others 
can trust in future. This is a point that is forcefully underlined in Odysseus’ warning 
that Agamemnon, king though he is, must be more just from now on (19.181-3). Such 
an emphatic statement of his responsibility for his actions, of his liability, in spite of 
his rank, to be blamed when he has acted wrongly, draws a line under the quarrel that 
marks out the point from which Agamemnon can begin to recover some of the 
authority that he has lost.
58
 Similarly, though it is exculpatory where Odysseus’ 
evaluation is condemnatory, the scope of Agamemnon’s explanation in terms of atē is 
strictly limited to his need for a story that saves a degree not merely of face but of his 
integrity as a responsible social interactant, and in particular as a leader capable both 
of commanding the confidence of his followers and of receiving the credit for his 
successes. If this role is to be maintained, then Agamemnon’s behaviour towards 
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 Odysseus is equally emphatic on Agamemnon’s liability to legitimate censure in 
questioning his fitness to command, at what may be Agamemnon’s lowest ebb, in 
Book 14 (82-102). Similarly, Poseidon (in the guise of Calchas) affects to give voice 
to the sentiments of the army as a whole in censuring the ‘inadequacy’ (kakotēs, 108) 
of their king, responsible (aitios) for their current plight on account of his offence 
against Achilles (111-13). This is a manifestation of the widespread censure to which 
Agamemnon reveals his sensitivity at 14.49-50 and 19.85-6. 
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Achilles has to be an aberration. His speech implies not an imperfect but rather a 
robust notion of responsibility for one’s actions. Far from threatening the coherence 
of the Homeric conception of responsibility, it is, in fact, a move in a game in which 
such coherence is essential.
59
 
 
In Book 19, Agamemnon intends his Apology to exculpate. In that respect, signs in 
the speech itself and in its reception indicate failure. As a strategy to move on from 
the quarrel, however, distancing Agamemnon from his actions and placing his 
estrangement from Achilles firmly in the past, the speech fulfils a political function 
that is not dependent upon its persuasiveness as an attempt to evade responsibility. 
The link that the Apology presupposes between atē and a robust notion of 
responsibility in all normal circumstances is maintained both when atē is advanced as 
a mitigating factor and when it is presented as an aggravating factor. In Book 9, 
Agamemnon himself accepts responsibility (not just liability, but the blame that 
Nestor has just enunciated) for an action which, while to some degree ‘out of 
character’, is none the less his, and one for which he must make amends. In Book 1, 
Achilles uses his reference to Agamemnon’s atē to present him as a deliberate and 
serial offender who on this occasion miscalculates in thinking that he can offend 
without consequence; this culpable error itself belongs with a characteristic failure to 
deliberate effectively. Agamemnon’s atē, according to Achilles, compounds and 
contributes to his moral offence as a culpable form of oversight to which Agamemnon 
is prone. His failure to project himself into the future, to foresee the consequences of 
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his actions, is a typical one for which, Achilles believes, Agamemnon will bear full 
responsibility once the consequences of his actions become apparent (1.240-4, 338-
44, 410-12). In its subjective sense, as a state of mind that leads to an objectively 
disastrous state of affairs, atē is indeed a form of ignorance or negligence, but for 
Homer’s characters as for us such negligence may be more or less culpable.60 Atē 
explains errors both in and out of character. Both types of error rest on the notion of a 
temporally extended self with both a future and a past, whose acts have consequences 
both foreseen and unforeseen, and who is answerable to others both for particular 
actions and for the motivations from which they derive.  
 
In addition, though attribution of the harm caused by atē to external and especially 
divine sources can be used to exculpate or mitigate, the notion of the goddess Atē 
herself or of gods who send atē presupposes a fundamental concept of responsible, 
effective human agency.
61
 In these cases, when the results of an action prove to be at 
variance with the intentions of the person who performed it, those results are 
attributed to a personality of another kind, an agent with a different agenda. The 
behaviour of the anthropomorphic Homeric gods is created on the model of effective 
human agency. Thus (pace Stallmach (1968) 96, and a host of scholars of that ilk) 
there is in the Homeric poems no trace of a primitive stage at which the basic notion 
of agency and its implications are not understood. Explanations of phenomena such as 
atē as originally supernatural are unintelligible. Though the attribution of forms of 
action and causation to personified forces creates an arena in which there may be, 
arguably and to varying degrees, aspects of human action that can be regarded as 
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having extra-human causes, the very concept of anthropomorphic gods as effective 
doers of deeds is logically and temporally posterior to a perfectly ordinary conception 
of human beings as source and effective cause of their actions. If anything, the notion 
of personal agency has an even more powerful grip on the presentation of causality in 
the Homeric poems than it does on our own ways of thinking about the subject. 
 
Atē is a major theme in the Iliad.62 It has its role to play in the causation of the war 
itself, in so far as Paris’ abduction of Helen is described in its terms.63 It is in the 
poem’s central theme, however, namely the quarrel of Achilles and Agamemnon and 
its consequences, that it plays its most prominent role, as is clear both from the sheer 
number of passages in which it is associated with Agamemnon’s behaviour and from 
the thematic salience of the two passages in which the concept is allegorized and 
personified in Books 9 and 19. But if the quarrel and its resolution turn to a great 
extent upon the issue of Agamemnon’s atē, then the atē-theme will have inevitable 
implications for the presentation of Achilles.
64
 The possibility of an intersection 
between Agamemnon’s and Achilles’ atē is (as I have already noted) clearly 
emphasized in Phoenix’s allegory of the Litai, but since there has been occasional 
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 The association of atē with Achilles is central to the thesis of Yamagata (2005), 
which is valuable in highlighting how the atē of other characters reflects their 
relations with him; but I cannot follow her in her claim that it is as agent and author of 
atē in others, “almost like the goddess Ate herself” (p.22), that Achilles embodies the 
theme. This seems to me to involve a substantial misinterpretation (see her pp.22-3) 
of the rhetorical purpose of Phoenix’s allegory of the Litai. 
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disagreement both about the import of the allegory itself and the extent to which the 
prospect of atē in Achilles’ case is realized in the ensuing narrative, it is necessary to 
justify this impression at slightly greater length. First, as we have noted more than 
once above, it is clear that the initial point of Phoenix’s allegory is to present 
Agamemnon’s gifts as atonement for the offence committed in Book 1: the gods 
themselves are swayed by gifts and prayer, when a human being “transgresses and 
errs” (497-501); a fortiori Achilles too should subdue his anger (496-7). Atē (sc. 
Agamemnon’s offence) comes first, but the Litai (sc. the ambassadors and their 
message regarding Agamemnon’s readiness to make amends) come after to undo the 
damage she has caused (502-7). Since Achilles has already predicted that 
Agamemnon will regret his atē (1.411-12), and Agamemnon has already accepted that 
it was atē to dishonour Achilles (9.115-20), there can, pace Yamagata, be no question 
of the allegorized Atē, strong and swift-footed though she is, standing primarily for 
Achilles’ conduct in Book 1 rather than Agamemnon’s.65 The next stage of Phoenix’s 
argument, also noted above, is to suggest that rejection of Agamemnon’s offer could 
be as big an error as Agamemnon’s original offence, something that Achilles will 
come to regret as much as Agamemnon, it is implied, now regrets his behaviour in 
Book 1 (508-14). These two points, the retrospective and the prospective, are then 
explicitly applied to Achilles’ case in the sequel (513ff.). Achilles is urged to grant 
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the Litai, the daughters of Zeus, the honour they deserve (513-14) – thus he is 
explicitly identified as the one who will benefit from acceptance of the Litai and be 
harmed, through Atē, if he rejects them, as in the allegory at 508-12.66 Agamemnon 
was the original offender (were he still behaving as he did in Book 1, says Phoenix at 
515-18, then he, Phoenix, would not be asking Achilles to abandon his anger at the 
original offence); but now he is making amends (515, 519) and has sent men to 
entreat on his behalf (520-2: note λίσσεσθαι in 520, picking up 501, 502, and 511), 
and so anger is no longer appropriate; Achilles should honour his friends, whom 
Agamemnon has entrusted with his entreaties, or risk indignation (nemesis, i.e. blame) 
if he does not (522-3); the Meleager paradigm then gives an example of a hero whose 
persistence in anger came at a cost to himself (524-99), a risk that also attends 
Achilles, if it should turn out that he has to fight and fight well, but forfeit esteem in 
the eyes of his fellows (600-5).
67
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 See nn.10-11, 29-31 above. 
67
 The anonymous reader for PLLS acutely points out that, in responding to this last 
element of Phoenix’s warning, Achilles makes the same mistake as Agamemnon in 
Book 1: he imagines that he can do without the esteem of the Achaeans and rely 
instead upon the honour granted him by Zeus (9.607-10; cf. Agamemnon at 1.174-5). 
Each thinks that he knows the mind of Zeus and is confident that his actions will 
achieve the outcome he desires; this confidence leads each to subordinate others to his 
own ends; and in each case such confidence is shown to be misplaced, at variance 
with Zeus’ actual purposes. 
48 
In essence, Phoenix’s argument is similar to Odysseus’: Odysseus also accepts that 
Achilles has a grievance (for such is the implication of his reference to Achilles’ 
cholos at 259-61 and 299), but holds that Agamemnon’s gifts are enough to assuage it 
(259-99). But like Phoenix, he also stresses that Achilles has other reasons for 
returning to the fray, reasons to do with his loyalty to his comrades (230-1, 247-8, 
300-6);
68
 if Achilles neglects this consideration, he argues, he may live to regret it 
(249-51): 
 
 “αὐτῷ  τοι μετόπισθ’ ἄχος ἔσσεται, οὐδέ τι μῆχος 
 ῥεχθέντος κακοῦ ἔστ’ ἄκος εὑρεῖν· ἀλλὰ  πολὺ πρὶν  
 φράζευ ὅπως Δαναοῖσιν ἀλεξήσεις κακὸν ἦμαρ.” 
 
There are thus plenty of indications in Iliad 9 that rejection of the Embassy is 
something that Achilles will come to regret. The Meleager paradigm is in one sense a 
case of misdirection (Achilles’ regret will not in the end focus on the loss of the gifts 
he was promised), but the suggestion that Achilles will rue his failure to respond to 
the claims of friendship is there in both Phoenix’s speech and Odysseus’. Phoenix, 
moreover, makes it clear that this regret will be, as Homeric regret often is, the result 
of atē. The point is, the audience already know that Achilles will not be persuaded to 
return to battle by the appeals addressed to him during the night narrated in Book 9. 
Hector’s success will continue on the next day, and will last until battle reaches the 
sterns of the Achaean ships, Patroclus is slain, and Achilles returns to the fray, as 
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 A point, of course, that is also emphasized by Ajax (630-42). 
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prophesied by Zeus at 8.470-7. This is the background against which we hear Book 
9’s warnings that Achilles will regret his persistence in anger; this prophecy provides 
a basis on which to interpret the prophetic orientation of Book 9 – not just Odysseus’ 
warning of achos to come (249), and not just Phoenix’s warning that Achilles may 
become subject to atē, but also the often-noted correspondence between the ‘scale of 
affection’ in the appeals of Meleager’s philoi and the sequence in Achilles’ own case, 
culminating in Book 16 with the appeal of Patroclus (as the appeals of Meleager’s 
philoi culminate in that of Cleopatra).
69
 Ultimately, then, the error that Achilles will 
regret is the refusal to return to battle and the decision to allow Patroclus to go in his 
stead. The error involved in the latter course of action is underlined by Zeus’ second 
prophecy of Patroclus’ death (and its consequences) at 15.64-71.70 The latter 
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 See Kakridis (1949) 19-25, 28-34, 39, 49-53, 159-64. On the names (Patro-klos and 
Kleo-patra) see Willcock (2001) 449 n.31; Alden (2000) 239-40 (each with references 
to earlier discussions). 
70
 On ancient scholars’ doubts about the two prophecies and their minor 
misdirections, see Kirk (1990) 334 on 8.475-6 and Janko (1992) 234-5 on 15.56-77; 
for an analysis in narratological terms, see Morrison (1992) 78-83, 92, 123. For 
Yamagata (1991) 14 = (1994) 59 Achilles’ atē cannot be a cause of Patroclus’ death, 
because “Everything is pre-ordained, including the death of Patroclus before 
Achilles’. Whatever Achilles does, his loss of Patroclus is inevitable.” Equally, one 
might say, whatever Patroclus does (at the height of his success in Book 16) his death 
is inevitable; this, indeed, is the point of 16.688-91; yet in the same passage (at 685-6) 
Patroclus is characterized as nēpios for the error (μέγ᾽  ἀάσθη) that leads to his 
death. We note, too, that where the plan of Zeus plays a role in Achilles’ acceptance 
50 
prophecy prepares for the fatal step that Achilles takes in Book 16, and his pathetic 
inability to foresee the results of his actions is underlined by Zeus’ refusal to grant his 
prayer for Patroclus’ safety at 16.233-52 and his own deluded wish that he and 
Patroclus should alone take Troy (16.97-100). Achilles’ own lack of insight in 
sending Patroclus into battle, as well as Patroclus’ error in disregarding Achilles’ 
instructions, are both emphasized when Achilles, concluding (correctly as it turns out 
and as the audience already knows) that Hector’s rout of the Achaean forces means 
that Patroclus is dead, remembers a prophecy from his mother that Patroclus’ death 
would occur, at the hands of the Trojans, before his own (18.6-14): Patroclus was 
schetlios in ignoring Achilles’ advice (13-14), but Achilles himself had reason to 
guard against such an outcome.
71
 In this sequence, because we know that the result of 
the agent’s actions will be very different from what he intends, we see atē in action. 
That the result of Achilles’ atē is the death of Patroclus is further emphasized by the 
use of the term itself with reference first to the blind, Zeus-inspired fury which leads 
                                                                                                                                           
of Agamemnon’s Apology at 19.270-4, it does not figure at all in his grief and regret 
over his failure to protect Patroclus at 18.80-2, 90-3, 98-116. Neither the characters 
nor the narrative support the kind of absolute fatalism to which Yamagata appeals. 
71
 In retrospect, therefore, Achilles’ failure to remember the prophecy in urging 
Patroclus not to attack Troy (16.87-96) is also latent at 17.401-11, where the narrator 
‘cuts’ from the fighting over Patroclus’ body to the waiting Achilles, who did not 
expect Patroclus to attempt to sack the city and still expects to see him return alive. 
On this and the other expressions of Achilles’ unfulfilled hopes for Patroclus, see 
Edwards (1991) 101-2 on 17.404-11; Rutherford (2001) 280; on the prophecy referred 
to at 18.6-15 and its relation to 17.404-11, cf. Edwards (1991) 142-3 on 18.8-11 and 
Rutherford (2001) 282 and n.54.  
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Patroclus (at 16.684-91) to ignore Achilles’ command (of 16.87-96) not to proceed 
against Troy, and then to the bewilderment that seizes him as he is overcome by his 
assailants (805).
72
 Some object that the atē of Patroclus cannot fulfil a warning that 
atē will overtake Achilles;73 but (a) the fates of Patroclus, Hector, and Achilles 
himself form a sequence linked by an extensive series of parallels, foreshadowings, 
and prophecies;
74
 (b) Patroclus is a surrogate Achilles who enters battle in Achilles’ 
own armour; and (c) as we see explicitly in the allegory of the Litai, atē is (for the 
purposes of this narrative sequence at least) transferable.
75
 We see the coming 
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 Cf. his ignorance of what is to come when he (in his folly, μέγα νήπιος, 16.46-7: 
cf. 685-6) appeals for a favour that will bring his own death. On nēpios and atē, cf. 
below [000] and n.84. 
73
 See Adkins (1982) 308; Yamagata (1991) 14 = (1994) 59; Van Wees (1992) 135; 
Alden (2000) 203; but contrast Alden (2000) 261-2, where she is more open to the 
idea that Achilles’ actions in the approach to Patroclus’ death do fulfil Phoenix’s 
warning against atē. In accepting that Achilles’ actions do lead to the atē of Patroclus, 
Yamagata (2005) 24 somewhat undermines the position of her earlier analysis (which 
she none the less defends at (2005) 21-2): given that Achilles cannot possibly intend 
his friend’s death, there is no way to avoid the conclusion that the contribution that 
his actions make to that outcome results from the disastrous error against which he 
was warned in Book 9. 
74
 See below, [000 at n.79]. 
75
 This is denied by Alden (2000) 203: but if the text insists that “the refuser of Λιταί 
and the one dogged by Ἄτη will be the same person”, it likewise insists that the atē 
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together of Achilles’ atē with that of Patroclus when Achilles himself expresses the 
fear that Patroclus’ misjudgement may have brought about an eventuality against 
which he himself had been warned (18.6-14 again). 
 
In any event, the clear indications that the rejection of the Embassy is an error whose 
consequences (compounded by further errors) encompass the death of Patroclus is 
matched by equally clear indications of Achilles’ regret once those consequences are 
known. One need not get into a debate over precisely how to label, in Greek or in 
English, the emotions expressed by Achilles over the death of Patroclus in Book 18 to 
recognize (a) his awareness that his prayer for the defeat of the Achaeans in Book 1 
has had disastrous consequences that he did not foresee (note the emphasis on the 
fulfilment of the prayer of Book 1 in Thetis’ questions and Achilles’ response at 
18.73-82), (b) his wish that Patroclus had not died (80-2), and (c) his self-reproach for 
his failure to keep Patroclus and his other comrades safe (98-106). He clearly regrets 
the original quarrel and the anger that it provoked in him (107-11), anger that the 
audience knows to have been crucial not just in his original withdrawal but also in his 
refusal to be reconciled.
76
 The death of Patroclus brings all this home to him, and it is 
                                                                                                                                           
that afflicted the original offender may pass to the one who refuses that offender’s 
reparation. 
76
 Contrast Yamagata (1994) 59-60, esp. p.60 (and cf. ead. (1991) 14-15): Achilles 
“never says, ‘I am sorry that I became angry.’ His logic is ‘I am sorry that he angered 
me’ (18.111).” But his own anger at Agamemnon is clearly something that Achilles 
regrets (18.107-10): it is a seductive emotion that overcomes one’s better judgement 
(ὅς τ' ἐφέηκε πολύφρονά περ χαλεπῆναι, 108), and he wishes that it would 
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the death of Patroclus that is advertised by Zeus in Book 8 as the consequence of his 
refusal to return to battle until Hector takes the fighting to the Achaean ships. This is 
surely the damage by which he pays for his rejection of the Litai (βλαφθεὶς 
ἀποτίσῃ , 9.512), the disastrous result of the error of which he is warned in Book 9. 
Similar regrets are apparent in Book 19: the quarrel was futile, its object a mere girl 
who should rather have died on the day of her capture; it benefited only Hector and 
the Trojans, and caused many Achaean deaths (19.56-63). Because Achilles now 
wishes the quarrel had not happened at all and because his regrets encompass the 
sufferings of the Achaeans in general (18.102-3, 19.61-2), it appears that his delusion 
began not in Book 9, but in Book 1, when he imagined that their destruction would 
achieve all that he desired, including the demonstration of Agamemnon’s atē (1.408-
12, cf. 240-4). In retrospect, it seems to be at that point rather than later that the atai 
of Achilles and Agamemnon begin to intertwine. That they are intertwined is further 
suggested by Achilles’ endorsement of Agamemnon’s Apology in Book 19 (270-4): 
 
 “Ζεῦ πάτερ, ἦ  μεγάλας ἄτας ἄνδρεσσι διδοῖσθα· 
 οὐκ ἂν δή ποτε θυμὸν ἐνὶ στήθεσσιν ἐμοῖσιν 
 Ἀτρεΐδης ὤρινε διαμπερές, οὐδέ κε κούρην 
 ἦγεν ἐμεῦ ἀέκοντος ἀμήχανος· ἀλλά ποθι Ζεὺς 
 ἤθελ’ Ἀχαιοῖσιν θάνατον πολέεσσι γενέσθαι.” 
                                                                                                                                           
vanish from the world, a hyperbolic way of saying that he wishes it had not 
overwhelmed him. 
54 
 
Whether or not Achilles is represented here as meaning to acknowledge that atē lay 
behind his anger as well as Agamemnon’s provocation,77 the lines clearly do raise the 
issue of his own contribution to the disastrous consequences of the quarrel, for the 
deaths of many Achaeans were not merely an eventuality that Zeus somehow decided 
to bring about but an end actively desired by Achilles himself in which he enlisted 
Zeus’ support. That this desire was a mistake with disastrous consequences is the 
burden of the allegory of the Litai in Book 9 and of Achilles’ regrets in Books 18 and 
19. As does Agamemnon in his Apology, here at 19.273-4 Achilles attributes his own 
error to divine purpose, and the resort to exculpatory mythology is as transparently 
self-serving in the one case as it is in the other; the use of the plurals ἄτας and 
ἄνδρεσσι in line 270 facilitates the conclusion that Achilles is as much a victim of 
atē as his erstwhile adversary. Scholars’ refusal to accept that conclusion rests on an 
unrealistically positivist demand that a scenario typically described in terms of a 
certain concept should be labelled with the appropriate term on every occurrence and 
at every stage. In the case of Achilles’ actions from Books 1 to 19, not only is there 
enough of the atē-scenario in the narrative to be identified by any audience capable of 
thinking for itself, but the central importance of the theme is emphasized by the use of 
the actual term in one of the most salient passages in the development of the quarrel 
                                                 
77
 So Scodel (2008) 123; cf. Lloyd-Jones (1971/1983) 23 and contrast Adkins (1982) 
308; Finkelberg (1995) 23 n.34. The extent to which, in 19.56-66, Achilles has shared 
responsibility for the quarrel and its consequences in fact makes it rather likely that he 
means to share the atē in 270-4. 
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and kept before us in subsequent occurrences of the term as the sequence reaches its 
conclusion in Books 16 and 19.
78
 
 
Thus the quarrel of Book 1 constitutes the beginning of a sequence of events that 
involves atē on the part of Agamemnon, Achilles, and Patroclus. Atē plays a pivotal 
role (especially in the Embassy of Book 9) in the process by which the ‘anger of 
Achilles’ theme is linked to the ‘Troy’ theme, with its focus on the death of Hector 
and, ultimately, the fall of his city. The episodes of Patroclus’ killing of Sarpedon, 
Hector’s killing of Patroclus, Achilles’ killing of Hector, and (beyond the poem’s 
end) Paris’ killing of Achilles are linked by a series of cross-references, prophecies, 
foreshadowings, and thematic parallels.
79
 In this sequence the atē of Achilles plays a 
crucial causal role – its consequence is Patroclus’ death and it is reflected in 
Patroclus’ own atē in the lead-up to his death. Behind Achilles’ atē is that of 
Agamemnon, and behind the entire fabula of the Trojan War is the atē of Paris. The 
final stage of this grand sequence to be narrated (rather than merely foreshadowed) in 
the Iliad is the death of Hector. But the term atē is never used of Hector, and there are 
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 For this general interpretation, see Bremer (1969) 106-7; Wyatt (1982) 254-6, 259-
60; Thornton (1984) 119, 123, 132, 135-6; Arieti (1988), esp. 5, 10; contrast Adkins 
(1982) 307-8; Edwards (1991) 267 on 19.270-5; Yamagata (1991) 13-15; (1994) 57-
60 (cf. (2005) 21); Wilson (2002) 100. 
79
 See esp. 15.59-77, 596-614; 16.644-55, 794-800, 844-61; 17.194-7, 201-8; 18.79-
116; 22.358-66 (esp. comparing 22.361-6 with 16.855-61), with Rutherford (2001) 
276-85; cf. Thornton (1984) 125-42; Edwards (1991) 7-10; Richardson (1993) 17-19. 
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some who would argue that he is free of that affliction, despite its prominence in the 
sequence which links him to Achilles and Patroclus.
80
 
 
The case for regarding Hector as a victim of atē, however, is strong. Partly, it rests on 
the reflection of the paradigmatic scenario of atē in his actions from Book 8 to Book 
22. First, Hector’s success (in Books 8 and 11-18) is explicitly circumscribed: it is 
strictly instrumental to Zeus’ plan to bring honour to Achilles, and its limit is defined 
by the latter’s absence from battle. Zeus provokes Hera by informing her that the 
change in the fortunes of the Trojans that is the subject of Book 8 will be sustained on 
the following day (i.e. Books 11-18), until Patroclus is killed and Achilles returns to 
the fray (8.470-7). In Book 11, Zeus sends Iris to Hector with the explicit message 
that his success will end with the setting of the sun on that day (11.192-4=207-9). He 
repeats these terms in Book 17 (453-5). But Hector becomes elated by his success: the 
turn in the tide of battle in Book 8 leads him to hope that the Achaeans can be driven 
from Troy; he predicts that, on the following day, he will kill Diomedes; and he utters 
the impossible wish that he might be deathless and ageless, honoured as Athena and 
Apollo are honoured, as surely as that day will bring evil to the Argives (8.525-41). In 
Book 13 he predicts that he will kill Ajax, and again wishes that he might be 
honoured like a god, son of Zeus and Hera, equal of Apollo and Athena, as surely as 
the present day brings evil to the Argives (824-32). In both cases, his confidence is 
proved false: when he does encounter Diomedes, the latter knocks him unconscious 
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 See Finkelberg (1995) 24; cf. Stallmach (1968) 58 n.80; contrast Bremer (1969) 
104-5. On Hector’s part in the sequence, especially his delusion and his error, see 
further Redfield (1975/1994) 136-59; Mueller (1984) 36-43, 60-4; Rutherford (2001) 
283-4. 
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(11.349-67); and he has to be rescued by his comrades after Ajax has knocked him to 
the ground with a stone (14.402-32). In both these passages, while one might say that 
the wishes to which he gives voice are merely adynata, implying no genuine 
aspiration towards divinity, still the form of expression, juxtaposing the permanent 
glory of the gods and the present day of Trojan success, effectively underlines his 
tendency to extrapolate from the temporary ascendancy that has been promised him to 
something far beyond his capabilities. 
 
Hector’s over-confidence on his ‘big day’ of success is highlighted by the contrast 
with the prudence of Polydamas.
81
 Polydamas’ credentials as a counsellor are 
established on his first appearance (12.60ff.), and the main function of his advice is to 
demonstrate Hector’s failure to remember that his ascendancy is circumscribed and 
temporary (12.200-50; 18.243-313). With Achilles’ reappearance on the field of battle 
and the setting of the sun in Book 18, the day of success promised by Zeus is over, yet 
Hector is convinced that divine favour will continue (18.293-5) and rejects 
Polydamas’ advice to return within the walls (284-309).82 Polydamas’ advice is 
prefaced by the narrator’s approval (249-52) and the Trojans are condemned as fools, 
nēpioi, for disregarding it (310-13) – Athena had taken away their wits (311). By 
Book 22, Hector has realized his mistake (99-110): 
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 On Polydamas and Hector, see now Clark (2007), building on Redfield 
(1975/1994). 
82
 A misplaced confidence that the human agent’s ends coincide with and are 
endorsed by the will of Zeus thus unites the atē of Agamemnon, Achilles, and Hector 
(see especially 12.233-42, 18.293-5 and cf. n.67 above). 
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 “ὤ  μοι ἐγών, εἰ μέν κε πύλας καὶ τείχεα δύω, 
 Πουλυδάμας μοι πρῶτος ἐλεγχείην ἀναθήσει,    100 
 ὅς μ’ ἐκέλευε Τρωσὶ ποτὶ πτόλιν ἡγήσασθαι 
 νύχθ’ ὕπο τήνδ’ ὀλοὴν ὅτε τ’ ὤρετο δῖος Ἀχιλλεύς. 
 ἀλλ’ ἐγὼ  οὐ πιθόμην· ἦ  τ’ ἂν πολὺ κέρδιον ἦεν. 
 νῦν δ’ ἐπεὶ ὤλεσα λαὸν ἀτασθαλίῃσιν ἐμῇσιν,  
 αἰδέομαι Τρῶας καὶ Τρῳάδας ἑλκεσιπέπλους,   105 
 μή ποτέ τις εἴπῃσι κακώτερος ἄλλος ἐμεῖο· 
 Ἕκτωρ ἧφι βίηφι πιθήσας ὤλεσε λαόν. 
 ὣς ἐρέουσιν· ἐμοὶ δὲ τότ’ ἂν πολὺ κέρδιον εἴη 
 ἄντην ἢ  Ἀχιλῆα κατακτείναντα νέεσθαι, 
 ἠέ κεν αὐτῷ  ὀλέσθαι ἐϋκλειῶς πρὸ  πόληος.”   110 
 
From Hector’s point of view, the results of ignoring Polydamas’ advice have been 
disastrous and he now regrets doing so: he has failed to achieve his purpose and 
instead put his city and his people in danger. The term that he uses of his own 
conduct, however, is not atē but atasthaliē.   
 
59 
The fullest case for a systematic distinction between atē and atasthaliē is made by 
Margalit Finkelberg (1995). According to her, they differ in that in atē but not in  
atasthaliē “the agent is not recognized either by himself or by others as an 
autonomous causer of what he has done” (1995: 16-17); atē involves acting in 
ignorance of the consequences, whereas those who are subject to atasthaliē know or 
are at least “aware of the possibility that the course of action they were taking could 
result in disaster” (1995: 18), because, unlike atē, atasthaliē involves ignoring advice 
or warnings (1995: 17-21). Hence “ate usually comes from the outside, [but] 
atasthalie is always man’s own” (1995: 20), and “while ate presupposes an error 
which originates in the irrational, atasthalie presupposes an error originating in the 
rational” (1995: 21).  
 
None of these differentiae will suffice to draw an absolute distinction between atē and 
atasthaliē. We have seen already that not all atē is exogenous. Equally, someone who 
acts under the influence of atē can be “recognized ... as the autonomous causer of 
what he has done”, at least if that means that the person is regarded as the responsible 
origin of his or her actions  – Achilles’ accusation of atē against Agamemnon at Iliad 
1.412 is, as we saw, blame, not exculpation, and Agamemnon used the same word in 
accepting responsibility for the consequences of his actions in Book 9 (115-20).
83
 At 
the point at which Agamemnon makes the error to which these passages refer, 
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 If by ‘autonomous’ Finkelberg means to set the bar higher than this, so that only 
action on the basis of rational deliberation, in full knowledge of all relevant 
circumstances, and free of interference from all competing internal or external sources 
of motivation will qualify, then this is a standard that neither atē nor atasthaliē will 
meet. 
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moreover, he is warned by both Achilles and Nestor that his actions will have 
undesirable consequences that he may come to regret (1.239-44, 254-8, 283-4). That 
Agamemon disregarded explicit warnings and instead “yielded to his own great-
hearted thymos” is emphasized by Nestor in Book 9 (108-10); Agamemnon agrees 
that he did as Nestor says, and calls these actions his atai (115-19). Similarly, 
Achilles is warned not only that it would be atē to reject the appeals of the Embassy, 
but that the consequences will be bad for him (9.508-12), and Patroclus’ atē is 
manifested in his failure to abide by the instructions of Achilles (16.684-7). For 
Finkelberg (1995: 20 n.22) the fact that Patroclus forgets the advice makes it 
appropriate to call it atē, whereas cases of atasthaliē (such as Hector’s rejection of 
Polydamas’ advice) “invariably emphasize the agent’s disagreement with the advice 
rather than his being oblivious of it”. As we have just noted, however, the atē of both 
Agamemnon and Achilles (in Books 1 and 9 respectively) lies not in their forgetting 
the advice they are given, but in their rejection of it. But if the atasthaliē of Hector in 
Book 22 resembles the atē of Agamemnon and Achilles in manifesting the same 
misguided and wilful rejection of sound advice, in his case the rejection of 
Polydamas’ advice itself derives from the fact that he has forgotten the warnings of 
Zeus that his success will last for only a single day.
84
 It thus springs from a failure to 
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 Cf. the condemnation of the Trojans as nēpioi for following Hector in rejecting 
Polydamas’ advice at 18.310-13, and the similar evaluation of Patroclus’ atē at 
16.686. Finkelberg (1995) 21 (cf. Bremer (1969) 101 n.9) agrees that Trojans’ 
behaviour at 18.310-13 is, in effect, characterized as atē, but dissociates their conduct 
from that of Hector, who allegedly knows what he is doing. But if he wilfully rejects 
Polydamas’ advice, he foolishly and blindly forgets Zeus’ warning; all those who 
reject Polydamas’ advice are nēpioi. Narratorial comment on characters’ folly (using 
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remember of a kind that that is called atē in the case of Patroclus: in the heat of battle 
and flushed with success they both forget explicit warnings of the limits that constrain 
them. That Hector’s was a disastrous error, moreover, is diagnosed, like atē, from its 
consequences. Indeed, Hector’s emphasis on the fact that it would clearly have been 
kerdion (103, 108) to heed Polydamas’ advice indicate that atasthaliē resembles atē in 
being antithetical to kerdos.
85
 With all these considerations in mind, Hector’s actions 
from Book 8 to Book 22 seem strongly to resemble the pattern that obtains in the 
cases of Agamemnon, Achilles, and Patroclus.
86
  
 
                                                                                                                                           
the terms nēpios, nēpioi) is a feature common to atē-sequences (Il. 2.37-40 with 111; 
16.46-7 with 685-6) and atasthaliē-sequences (Od. 1.7-8; cf. Medon’s use of nēpioi in 
condemning the suitors’ failure to honour Odysseus, which has now led to their 
downfall, 22.369-70; atasthaliē is not used, but the same behaviour is described as 
such elsewhere). Similarly, nēpios is often used of characters’ misguided assumptions 
that the results of their actions will be positive rather than disastrous (Il. 8.177-8; 
16.260-2; 17.31-2 = 20.197-8; 17.495-8; 20.466; 22.331-2), a scenario which could be 
construed in terms of atē; when the same usage is combined with wilful refusal to 
heed explicit warnings (Il. 12.108-17; Od. 9.43-61 – where one notes the similarity to 
the programmatic lines 1.7-9) one’s first thought might rather be of atasthaliē. On the 
intersection of atē, atasthaliē, and nēpios, cf. Stallmach (1968) 23-4; Bremer (1969) 
101-2, 105; Francis (1983) 81 and 108 n.12; Padel (1995) 170-1. 
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 Cf. above, n.2; Stallmach (1968) 12-13. 
86
 Given the frequent association between atē and apatē (n.27 above) one might also 
see the pattern in Hector’s deception at the hands of Athena, Il. 22.226-47, a delusion 
which he recognizes only when it is too late (294-303); so Bremer (1969) 105. 
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In characterizing his own conduct as atasthaliē Hector describes it pejoratively – he 
takes upon himself the condemnation of his conduct that he expects from others. He 
could have done this using the word atē (for atē can, as we have seen, be used of 
culpable error, both in emphatic condemnation, as at Il. 1.412, and in admission of 
fault, as at Il. 9.115-20). But atē and atasthaliē are not synonymous. While atē does 
not always exculpate, atasthaliē never does – it is always culpable. This is denied by 
Finkelberg, who writes (1995: 18): 
 
 Although it is true that the adjective atasthalos is often associated in Homer 
 with hubris and its cognates (which is especially true of the Odyssey), I cannot 
 agree with J.B. Hainsworth that this association “is the best indication of the 
 sense of this word” [Hainsworth (1988) on Od. 8.166]. Note that the two terms 
 are brought into connection with each other only when the behaviour deriving 
 from atasthalie is seen as morally condemnable as, for example, in the case of 
 the suitors. This is not so, however, in the case of Hector whose atasthalie 
 consists in keeping his troops outside the walls of Troy or in that of Odysseus 
 whose atasthalie consists in bringing his companions into the Cyclops’ cave 
 [Od. 10.437]; accordingly, hubris is not mentioned in these connections. This 
 seems to indicate that atasthalie as such is a morally neutral term which can be 
 qualified through hubris, not substituted by it. 
 
For Finkelberg, then, atasthaliē is distinct from atē in being endogenous and at least 
to some extent intentional, but distinct from hybris in not necessarily being 
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condemnatory.
87
 But the relation between atasthaliē and atē on the one hand and 
between atē, atasthaliē, and hybris on the other is more complicated than she 
suggests. The spectrum of scenarios covered by the root atasthal- includes aspects of 
both hybris- and atē-scenarios. As we shall see below, this is partly an artefact of a 
difference in usage between the adjective atasthalos and the noun atasthaliai (always 
plural in Homer).  
 
But first the issue of the alleged neutrality of atasthaliē. A footnote to the passage just 
quoted adds that the case for this proposition is supported by the expression 
ἀτασθαλίῃσι κακῇσιν at Od. 12.300 and 24.458. But “wicked atasthaliai” no 
more proves that some atasthaliai are not morally bad at all than ‘heinous murder’ 
proves that some murders are not morally bad at all. In such cases the condemnatory 
epithet emphasizes the noun’s analytically pejorative force. Not only are hybris-words 
used to emphasize the offence denoted by atasthaliē etc., but hybris itself can also be 
qualified as atasthalos (Od. 16.86; 24.352). These are not examples of the 
condemnatory force of hybris being qualified by the application of a morally neutral 
epithet, but of two condemnatory terms reinforcing each other: the adjective 
atasthalos is used to emphasize that hybris is a bad thing. Accordingly, qualification 
in terms of hybris is not required to indicate that atasthaliē is a bad thing. Evidence 
that words from the root atasthal- in themselves, unqualified, are used to condemn 
both agents and their actions in Homer is in fact plentiful. One example is furnished 
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 Finkelberg’s claim that the atasthaliē is intrinsically neutral in terms of moral 
evaluation, its negative charge being a matter of its contextual modification, is echoed 
by Cook (2009) 111 n.1. 
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by the wider context of one of the two passages just discussed: at Od. 16.85 ff. 
Telemachus explains that he will not risk exposing his guest, the disguised Odysseus, 
to the insults (κερτομέωσιν, 87) of the suitors: λίην γὰρ ἀτάσθαλον ὕβριν 
ἔχουσι (86). The disguised Odysseus then summarizes the behaviour of which he 
has just been told (and of which he was previously informed by Eumaeus at 14.81-95) 
as “the sort of atasthala that you say the suitors are contriving in the palace” (οἷα 
φατε μνηστῆρας ἀτάσθαλα μηχανάασθαι / ἐν μεγάροις, 16.93-4). In this 
passage, in which hybris is qualified as atasthalos, the term atasthala also serves in 
its own right to condemn deeds which might otherwise be described as hybris. The 
supplication of the priest, Leodes, in Odyssey 22 makes the point even more clearly, 
for here Leodes’ claim that he never said or did anything atasthalon to any of the 
women of the household, but rather attempted to restrain the suitors when they did 
such things (22.313-15) is a claim of moral innocence.
88
 Such examples could be 
multiplied: while the condemnatory force of atasthaliē is often supplemented by other 
condemnatory terms (especially hybris),
89
 that same force is also very often conveyed 
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 Cf. Od. 4.693: as a good king, Odysseus never did anything atasthalon to anyone – 
not a claim of infallibility, but a way of rephrasing the words οὔτε τινὰ  ῥέξας 
ἐξαίσιον in line 690. 
89
 See Il. 11.694-5; 22.418; Od. 3.206-7; 12.300-1; 17.587-8; 20.169-71, 369-70; 
24.281-2, 458. 
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by the use of the term itself, alone and unaided.
90
 Hence Hector in Iliad 22 uses 
atasthaliai not merely of the miscalculation involved “in keeping his troops outside 
the walls of Troy” but of behaviour that he knows renders him liable to what is, for a 
warrior and leader, serious criticism, that he overestimated his own abilities and so 
ruined his people (22.104-7).
91
 This is not an admission of hybris (see below), but nor 
is it a morally neutral presentation. If Finkelberg is right that not all atasthaliē is 
hybris, she is wrong that this makes atasthaliē a morally neutral term.  
 
We need to explore more fully atasthaliē’s affinities with atē on the one hand and 
hybris on the other. We saw above that Hector’s atasthaliai resembled atē especially 
in the application of the term to an instance of culpable and disastrous error. But in 
most of the passages in which atasthal-words are used, any implication that the 
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 See Od. 7.60 (the giants are an atasthalos people); 8.166 (Odysseus deduces that 
Euryalus is an atasthalos man because he has just insulted him); 18.139 (atasthala as 
the type of behaviour that results from violence and an absence of self-restraint), 143 
(contriving atasthala specified as offences against others); 21.146-7 (atasthaliai as 
the kind of behaviour that excites nemesis, that morally good people hate); 22.46-7 
(Eurymachus refers to the offences Odysseus has just condemned as atasthala).  
91
 To be sure, Hector attributes the criticism of 22.107 to τις κακώτερος (106), but 
he himself shares the negative evaluation of his conduct: as does τις κακώτερος in 
107, he describes it in 104 as “ruining the people”; the use of ἀτασθαλίῃσιν 
ἐμῇσιν in 104 does not represent a less severe judgement, but is rather part of 
Hector’s self-condemnation. 
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behaviour in question has proved or will prove disastrous for the agent is either absent 
or less than salient in the immediate context. This is where the divergence in usage 
and connotation between the adjective atasthalos and the noun atasthaliai enters the 
picture. An atasthalon action is primarily one that is excessive, outrageous, and 
negative in its impact on others. An atasthalos person possesses an entrenched 
disposition to behave in such ways. Hence, though the Epeians did in fact come to 
grief in the episode related by Nestor in Iliad 11, the designation of their acts as 
atasthala belongs with the condemnation of their arrogance (ὑπερηφανέοντες) 
and hybris (11.694-5); while the application of the adjective atasthalos to Achilles by 
Priam at Il. 22.418 picks out the disposition to excessive and outrageous behaviour 
that he has manifested in the treatment of Hector’s body and that Priam also captures 
in his use of the word obrimoergos in the same line. Priam does not mean to imply 
that Achilles’ character will be his own undoing. In fact, the adjective atasthalos (x 3 
Iliad, x 15 Odyssey) is never employed in the retrospective diagnosis of disastrous 
error on the basis of its consequences, but always denotes either excessive or 
outrageous behaviour or the tendency of persons to engage in such behaviour. 
Atasthalos is thus used of actions and dispositions that might otherwise be described 
in terms of hybris.
92
 By contrast, in the vast majority of the occurrences of the noun 
atasthaliai the emphasis is precisely on the disastrous consequences of the agent’s 
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 For the use of terms from the root atasthal- in condemnation of vices and offences 
comparable to hybris in Homer (both singly and in combination with hybris-words) 
see Fisher (1992) 151-84 passim. Fisher demonstrates (here and in other chapters) a 
continuity in the sense and reference of atasthalos between Homer and later authors 
that is denied by Finkelberg (1995) 18 n.13. 
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behaviour, a notion that we saw is intrinsic to atē. Of eleven occurrences (x 2 Iliad, x 
9 Odyssey), only one does not have this reference – at Od. 21.146-7 the narrator 
observes that the atasthaliai of the suitors were hateful to Leodes alone, and adds a 
reference to the nemesis that the suitors aroused in him (ἀτασθαλίαι δέ οἱ οἴῳ  / 
ἐχθραὶ ἔσαν, πᾶσιν δὲ νεμέσσα μνηστήρεσσιν). To be sure, the suitors’ 
demise is at hand, but the primary reference of both atasthaliai and nemesis is to the 
moral character of their actions as such. All the other cases of the noun, however, 
involve the recognition that agents’ culpable behaviour has proved (or, in one case, 
will prove) to be their own downfall; in nine of these ten instances, the point is made 
by means of the use of the noun in the dative plural, giving the cause of the agents’ 
ruin;
93
 the remaining occurrence (Od. 23.67, in Penelope’s judgement of the suitors) 
is a variation of the same expression using διά and accusative plural. Four of the nine 
occurrences of the dative plural usage emphasize the agent’s or agents’ responsibility 
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 Il. 4.409 (the Seven against Thebes, whose atasthaliai and failure are contrasted 
with the success, piety, and divine support of the Epigonoi in lines 406-8); 22.104 
(Hector); Od. 1.7 (Odysseus’ companions, having eaten the cattle of Helios), 34 
(human beings in general, with the particular example of Aegisthus); 12.300-1 (a 
prospective/hypothetical reference to the atasthaliai of Odysseus’ companions, which 
would ensure their ruin were they to slaughter any of Helios’ cattle; the disastrous 
outcome is foreshadowed at 295); 22.317 (Leodes on the suitors), 416 (Odysseus on 
the suitors); 24.458 (Halitherses on the suitors). Od. 10.437 is a variation in which 
Eurylochus blames Odysseus’ atasthaliai for the loss of their comrades in the 
Cyclops’ cave. 
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for their own ruin by means of a possessive pronoun, “their own” or “my own” 
atasthaliai,
94
 but the application of the noun to conduct for which the agent is 
culpable is clear in all cases.
95
 There is no question of a complete separation in 
meaning between these uses of the noun and those of the adjective discussed above. 
The emphasis on disastrous consequences does not remove the emphasis on 
culpability that the term always entails. Indeed, the same pattern, in which agents’ 
misdemeanours prove, against expectation, to be their undoing, can also be expressed 
in terms of hybris.
96
 Thus the emphasis on disastrous consequences does not in itself 
imply an assimilation or approximation to atē: to say that one’s hybris has proved 
ruinous is not necessarily to say that one has blindly committed a disastrous error. But 
it is still significant that the noun atasthaliē, unlike the adjective atasthalos (or, for 
that matter, the two Odyssean instances of a verb, ἀτασθάλλω, to be considered 
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 Il. 4.409; 22.104; Od. 1.7, 34; cf. Finkelberg (1995) 19-21. 
95
 And of course the two occurrences in Od. 1 (7 and 34) famously occur in 
programmatic contexts which emphasize human beings’ culpability in bringing 
needless suffering upon themselves. This culpability is evidently maintained even 
where human atasthaliai result in an outcome already desired by divine forces (Od. 
12.295, 300-1). 
96
 See Odysseus’ lying tales at 14.259-72 (to Eumaeus) and 17.427-41 (to Antinous). 
In both tales, the protagonist’s companions ignore his warnings, yield to their hybris, 
and suffer the consequences, in a way that both recalls the atasthaliai of Odysseus’ 
actual companions in eating the cattle of Helios and serves as a paradigm for the 
hybris of the suitors. For similar scenarios using the term nēpios, cf. above,  
[000/n.84]. 
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below), can combine a focus on culpable behaviour with an emphasis on human 
inability to foresee and forestall the consequences that ensue. Halitherses’ judgement 
on the suitors’ downfall helps illustrate the focus of such locutions on both culpability 
and miscalculation (Od. 24.454-60): 
 
 “κέκλυτε δὴ  νῦν μευ, Ἰθακήσιοι, ὅττι κεν εἴπω. 
 ὑμετέρῃ  κακότητι, φίλοι, τάδε ἔργα γένοντο·    455 
 οὐ γὰρ ἐμοὶ πείθεσθ', οὐ Μέντορι ποιμένι λαῶν, 
 ὑμετέρους παῖδας καταπαυέμεν ἀφροσυνάων, 
 οἳ μέγα ἔργον ἔρεζον ἀτασθαλίῃσι κακῇσι, 
 κτήματα κείροντες καὶ ἀτιμάζοντες ἄκοιτιν 
 ἀνδρὸς ἀριστῆος· τὸν δ' οὐκέτι φάντο νέεσθαι.”   
 460 
 
The suitors’ actions involved misjudgements (aphrosynai, 457), and they wrongly 
assumed that Odysseus would never return (460). But these errors belong with their 
“wicked atasthaliai” in consuming the property and dishonouring the wife of a man 
of high status. This is the kind of imprudence, like that of Agamemnon in the eyes of 
Achilles at Il. 1.412, that is integral to the offence. The closeness of atasthaliai of this 
type to cases of atē involving culpable error and deliberate offence is perhaps best 
illustrated by the case of the centaur Eurytion in Odyssey 21: he leaves bearing the 
consequences of his own atē (ἣν ἄτην ὀχέων ἀεσίφρονι θυμῷ , 302); he 
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himself is the sole cause of the misfortune that he has suffered (οἷ δ' αὐτῷ  
πρώτῳ  κακὸν εὕρετο οἰνοβαρείων, 304). Though the form of the locution is 
different, this emphasis bears comparison with those cases in which individuals bring 
about their own downfall through “their own atasthaliai”.97  
 
Across the range of its uses, then, atasthaliē is much more consistently condemnatory 
than is atē, and this focus on culpability is highlighted also in those cases in which the 
reference of the term most resembles that of atē. Atē, on the other hand, can, but need 
not be condemnatory, and its focus is much more definitively on the disastrous 
consequences of an action than on the action’s intrinsic moral character. Yet atē-
scenarios and atasthaliē scenarios can overlap and resemble each other. This is 
particularly true when atē is used of the failure to appreciate that a deliberate offence 
will have disastrous consequences. We have already noted that Achilles sees 
Agamemnon as both subject to atē and guilty of hybris. Under this construction, 
Agamemnon’s atē bears comparison with the atasthaliai of the suitors: both 
Agamemnon and the suitors should know better; they are warned by others that their 
actions are not only wrong but likely to prove disastrous; they ignore advice in the 
mistaken belief that they can dishonour others without negative consequences for 
themselves; and their conduct is regarded as hybris not only by their victims but by 
others. Agamemnon’s culpable atē, as represented by Achilles, appears to be very 
close indeed to the suitors’ atasthaliē and hybris. The approximation of atē and hybris 
emerges also in the case of the Locrian Ajax at Od. 4.499-511, whose atē involves 
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 Cf. n.94 above. 
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arrogant speech that insults the gods.
98
 Equally, Paris’ atē in outraging his host and 
abducting Helen (Il. 6.356; 24.28) is an action that Menelaus refers to as aischea and 
lōbē at Il. 13.622-3, the conduct of a nation of hybristai (633) whose menos is 
atasthalon (634).
99
 Likewise, the atē of the centaur Eurytion (especially Od. 21.294, 
297-8) involves the kind of sympotic excess that is often characterized as hybris, and 
since Antinous’ exemplum clearly has an ironic application to himself, 100 the 
centaur’s atē will also be brought into relation with what is regularly called the hybris 
and atasthaliē of the suitors. 
 
It seems, then, that there is scope for a rapprochement between atē and atasthaliē that 
depends first on the fact that atē can be used of culpable behaviour and secondly on 
the regular application of the noun atasthaliai to conduct which proves disastrous for 
the agent. Such a rapprochement is no doubt facilitated by an all-but inevitable 
popular etymology of atasthaliē as deriving from τὸ  τῇ  ἄτῃ   (vel ταῖς ἄταις) 
θάλλειν (“blooming with atē”) that is common in ancient scholarship.101 That this is 
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 Cf. Fisher (1992) 177. 
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 For the text in Il. 6.356 and 24.28 see n.22 above. 
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 Cf. Francis (1983) 117 n.67; Fisher (1992) 175-6. 
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 Σ Y Od. 1.34; Σ Hes. Th. 164; Σ Op. 239; Σ Opp. Hal. 3.491; Apoll. Soph. Lex. 
Hom. 46.24 Bekker; Hsch. α 8026 s.v. ἀτασθαλίαι; Et. Gen. α 1341 s.v. 
ἀτασθαλία; Et. Gud. α 224 s.v. ἀτάσθαλος; Eustath. Comm. Od. 1.8.1-2 on Od. 
1.7; Et. Mag. 162.36-8 s.v. ἀτασθαλία; etc. The Homeric scholia also frequently 
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not the genuine etymology of the word does not in any way prevent its exerting an 
influence on poets and their audiences,
102
 and in fact such an influence appears to be 
present in Menelaus’ denunciation of the Trojans at Il. 13.620-39, where the prime 
example of the arrogance and hybris with which he charges them is the dishonour 
they inflicted upon him by violating the ordinances of Zeus Xenios and stealing his 
wife – an action elsewhere attributed to the atē of Paris (6.356; 24.28). First, the 
Trojans are charged with arrogance (hyperphialoi, 621) and their shameless 
dishonouring of their victim is emphasized (ἄλλης μὲν λώβης τε καὶ αἴσχεος 
οὐκ ἐπιδευεῖς / ἣν ἐμὲ λωβήσασθε κακαὶ κύνες, 622-3). The explicit 
accusation of hybris, which is what this representation entails, soon follows at 633: in 
helping the Trojans, Zeus is inexplicably favouring hybristai. What is most interesting 
about this passage for our purposes is its emphasis on the link between hybris and 
koros, satiety: the “overweening Trojans” have an insatiable appetite for battle 
                                                                                                                                           
gloss atē and atasthaliē in identical terms as hamartia, blabē, or phrenoblabeia: cf. Σ 
Od. 1.7,  34;  Σ D Il. 22.104 on atasthaliē with Σ bT Il. 2.111; Σ D Il. 1.412; 19.95; Σ 
Od. 1.34; 15.233 on atē. But atasthaliē is not the only term that the scholiasts derive 
from atē: cf. Σ bT Il. 18.7 and 22.474 on ἀτύζεσθαι. 
102
 Pace Finkelberg (1995) 18, citing Chantraine (1968-80) i. 132 s.v. ἀτάσθαλος; 
cf. Leumann (1950) 215 n.10 (who notes, however, that the association with atē is 
natural one for native speakers to make); Beekes (2010) 161 s.v. ἀτάσθαλος. On 
the felt nature of the etymology, cf. Francis (1983) 81 and 108 n.12 (cf. 75-82 in 
general on the influence of popular etymologies); Fisher (1992) 155. 
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(Τρῶες ὑπερφίαλοι δεινῆς ἀκόρητοι ἀϋτῆς, 621); they cannot get their fill of 
war (οὐδὲ δύνανται / φυλόπιδος κορέσασθαι ὁμοιΐου πτολέμοιο, 634-
5); there is satiety in all things, even those which are much more desirable than war; 
but it is battle for which the Trojans are insatiable (πάντων μὲν κόρος ἐστὶ ... 
Τρῶες δὲ μάχης ἀκόρητοι ἔασιν, 636-9). Admittedly, the explicit link here is 
between hybris and insatiability, rather than satiety, but this is surely not a sign that 
the link between hybris and koros, familiar from later archaic and classical 
literature,
103
 is inactive. The notion that satiety and insatiability go together is in fact a 
typical one: koros regularly denotes the greed of those for whom too much is never 
enough.
104
 That being so, we notice a link between hybris, koros, and atasthaliē in 
633-5: in favouring the Trojans, Zeus gratifies hybristai, whose menos is atasthalon 
and who cannot get their fill (κορέσασθαι) of warfare. If atasthalon activates the 
etymology “blooming with atē” then this is the earliest occurrence of what Fisher 
calls “the characteristic ‘archaic chain’ of greed, koros, hybris and ate”.105 This would 
presuppose the common later presentation of hybris (and sometimes atē too) in terms 
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 See (in preference to Doyle (1984) 35-46) Fisher (1992) 70-6, 213, 217-18, 221-3, 
230-8, 240-2, 272-4, 280, 336, 347-50, 375-6. For the presence of the link here, cf. 
Janko (1992) 125 on 13.633-5. 
104
 See e.g. Sol. 4.9, 13.71-6 W = Thgn. 226-31, Thgn. 605-6, 693-4, with Helm 
(1993). 
105
 Fisher (1992) 72 (cf. 206, 213, 221, 236ff.). Cf. Sol. 4.34-5 W; A. Pers. 821-2; Ag. 
763-73; also Anhalt (1993) 79-96; Balot (2001) 91-3; Helm (2004), esp. 25-34. 
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of exuberant plant-like growth,
106
 and possibly also activate a popular etymological 
link between atē and the verb ἄω, “satiate”, “to take one’s fill of”.107 Menos, as an 
internal substance that gives a creature its force, would be an especially appropriate 
entity to be qualified as “swelling with atē”.108 That this etymology is known to the 
audience of the Odyssey, at least, is suggested by the occurrence in two passages of 
that poem – and nowhere else except in grammarians and commentators – of a verbal 
form ἀτασθάλλω that seems designed to activate it.109 If all of this is right, an 
association between atē and atasthaliē will inevitably have affected the Homeric 
usage and the Homeric audience’s interpretation of both terms. Such a rapprochement 
of the two terms will thus have contributed to the interconnexions between atasthaliē, 
atē, hybris, koros, and ‘blooming’ or ‘flourishing’ that are common in the later 
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 On which see Michelini (1978); Fisher (1992) 13-14, 120-1, 449-50; Cairns (1996) 
24-6, 28-30. Note the application of this imagery also to atē at Sol. 4.34-5 W; A. 
Pers. 821-2. 
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 For passages presupposing this link (of which the best example is Pi. O. 1.55-8), 
see Wyatt (1982) 265-7; though he cites alleged Homeric examples on pp.263-5, 
however, he does not include this passage from Il. 13, and those he does include do 
not entirely convince. Wyatt himself sees ‘surfeit’ or ‘satiety’ as the original meaning 
of atē, a sense which he argues developed into the Homeric ‘remorse (for an act)’ or 
‘remorse-causing act’ via a natural association between over-indulgence and regret. 
We do not have to accept this hypothesis to see an attraction between atē and koros in 
this and other passages. 
108
 On menos, see Jahn (1987) 39-45; Clarke (1999) 110-11. 
109
 See Od. 18.56-7; 19.87-8. 
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archaic period and beyond.  
 
Even though a link between atē and atasthaliē is likely to have been felt in some 
passages, however, it will not have amounted to a full-scale harmonization of the two 
concepts; and even in the minds of those who made that link the two will not have 
been synonymous. Atē is firmly tied to single sequences of cause, action, and effect; 
etymologized as ‘blooming with atē’, on the other hand, atasthaliē should imply a 
dispositional tendency, the tendency to be atasthalos or to commit atasthala, a 
reprehensible tendency towards culpable atē. In Homeric usage, moreover, being 
atasthalos is, as we have seen, not primarily or essentially a tendency blindly to 
commit errors which have disastrous results, but rather to behave in excessive and 
outrageous ways. Thus potential overlap between the two concepts would seem to be 
limited to cases which may be presented in terms of culpable, endogenous, and 
disastrous error, which is not, by any means, the full range of usage in either case. 
 
Against this background, Hector’s atasthaliai stand out somewhat. His use of the term 
is likely to imply that he has been subject to atē – his atasthaliai are wilful and 
culpable errors resulting from a fundamental delusion about what he is able to 
achieve, a delusion that has now proved disastrous. This presentation sets his career 
within a pattern of error, disaster, and regret that obtains also in the cases of 
Agamemnon and Achilles.  Arguably, at least, an audience’s sense that atasthaliē is in 
some way related to atē helps them place his conduct within a thematic nexus that 
begins with Agamemnon’s atē in Book 1 and extends through the disastrous errors 
that cost Achilles his best friend. Yet Hector’s atasthaliai are atypical. In this case the 
divergence in usage and connotation between the noun and its cognate adjective is at 
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its greatest. For Hector is not atasthalos in any sense in which that adjective is applied 
to persons in Homer. In contrast, all but one of the other cases of the dative plural 
locution (so and so perished as a result of his or their atasthaliai) deal with deliberate 
offences that are or might be described as hybris and thus drive no wedge between 
committing atasthaliai and being atasthalos.
110
 In Iliad 22, however, Hector surely 
does not mean to present his own conduct as something akin to hybris: as Fisher has 
pointed out, Hector (though he deliberately disregarded Polydamas’ advice) did not 
deliberately inflict such damage on his people, nor was his intention (unlike that of 
Agamemnon or of the suitors) to enhance his own honour at his victims’ expense.111 
Here culpable error, even moral failure, none the less stops short of deliberate moral 
offence. In this respect Hector’s atasthaliai stand almost alone among Homeric 
instances of that noun.  
 
It is instructive to compare Hector’s atasthaliai with the atē that Achilles attributes to 
Agamemnon (Il. 1.412). The latter refers to behaviour that Achilles does regard as 
hybris, as a deliberate moral offence. In certain circumstances, then, an action 
attributed to atē (Agamemnon’s at 1.412) can be more like hybris than one that is 
attributed to atasthaliē (Hector’s at 22.104). In Agamemnon’s case, atē, whose origin 
is sometimes regarded as external to the individual and which can be used to 
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 Il. 4.409 (the impiety of the Seven against Thebes); Od. 1.7; 12.300 (Odysseus’ 
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remaining passage, see n.114 below. 
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 Fisher (1992) 178. 
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dissociate the individual from his or her actions, is not only used of an action which 
the speaker regards as a deliberate outrage but is actually part of the speaker’s 
condemnation of that action. Hector, on the other hand, uses a word which is regularly 
associated with deliberate wrongdoing, but with reference to a lesser offence, a 
culpable error whose causes may have been deliberate actions, even deliberate 
disregard of warnings that disaster would result, but still an error whose true nature 
Hector recognizes only in retrospect and which does not result from a deliberate 
decision to contravene an ethical norm. Though there are criteria that can be used to 
distinguish atē and atasthaliē in general (atē may be exogenous, but atasthaliē never 
is; atē may exculpate, but atasthaliē never does; and atē only sometimes condemns, 
whereas atasthaliē always does) none of these will serve in the comparison of these 
two cases (Achilles blames Agamemnon as Hector blames himself; neither Achilles 
nor Hector thinks that the error in question has an origin external to the agent). The 
scripts associated with both scenarios are similar: Agamemnon has disregarded 
warnings in embarking on a course that Achilles believes will prove disastrous for the 
Achaeans and so for Agamemnon himself; Hector has recognized that his refusal to 
heed Polydamas’ warnings has proved disastrous for his people and so disastrous for 
himself. Yet it is still plausible that Achilles’ reference to Agamemnon’s atē picks out 
something slightly different from what Hector identifies in his reference to his own 
atasthaliai. Agamemnon wilfully ignores advice and deliberately dishonours Achilles, 
but this is not the focus of the word atē in his case. As used by Achilles at Il. 1.412, 
atē refers to a genuine (but still culpable) error – Agamemnon cannot foresee the 
consequences of his hybristic behaviour and thinks that he will be able to carry it 
through without harm to himself. The point of Achilles’ use of the word is to 
emphasize the element of ignorance and the gulf that will open up between present 
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ignorance and future regret once the consequences of the action are known.
112
 Had 
Achilles said that Agamemnon would come to recognize not his atē but his atasthaliai 
he would not have been presenting a radically different scenario, but rather slanting 
the same scenario in slightly different terms, focusing in the use of the term itself not 
on the lack of insight as such, but on its wilful and reprehensible character. Atē’s 
association with action performed in ignorance of its disastrous consequences is 
intrinsic; the primary focus of atasthaliai seems rather to be the element of wilfulness 
and the blameworthiness of the action as such.
113
 In most cases of the noun, the 
blameworthiness of the act resides in its nature as a deliberate offence. This is not true 
of Hector’s castigation of his own atasthaliai – though his actions may have been 
deliberate, he did not deliberately set out to offend; but still the reason for the choice 
of term appears to lie in its strongly condemnatory force. There is no comparable 
first-person reference to a character’s own culpable atē; the most strongly 
condemnatory uses of that term are all third-person. The strongest first-person use of 
atē in a non-exculpatory way is Agamemnon’s private admission of a catalogue of 
atai at Il. 9.115-20, which, as we have seen, accepts blame but presents the behaviour 
in question as aberrant. Hector’s choice of a strongly condemnatory term, indeed a 
term which normally refers to the deliberate contravention of norms, emphasizes his 
sense that he has failed to live up to the norms to which he should aspire. His self-
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though she uses this difference as the basis for wider generalizations that the evidence 
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reproach is warranted, yet the term atasthaliai retains a touch of hyperbole.
114
 The 
severity of his self-reproach contrasts not only with Agamemnon’s use of atē in 
accepting a degree of blame in book 9 but also with the same character’s boldly 
exculpatory use of the same term in Book 19. It is a notable feature of Homeric 
characterization that characters who are hard on themselves emerge in a positive light 
– not only Helen (at 3.173-5, 240-2; 6.344-58; 24.763-75), but also Achilles, whose 
self-reproach at Il. 18.80-93 and 98-110 bears close comparison with that of Hector in 
Book 22. Like Hector, Achilles focuses not just on a failure but on a failure as 
comrade and leader; Hector makes the moral aspect of this failure clear when he calls 
it atasthaliai, but the moral failing that has resulted from Achilles’ atē is no less clear. 
In their subjective reactions to their failures as well as in the presentation of their 
actions in terms of a culpable blindness that leads to disaster Achilles and Hector are 
close. If Achilles’ error is atē and Hector’s atasthaliē, this does not mean that the 
former’s reaction is ‘non-moral’ and the latter’s ‘moral’: there is genuine self-
criticism in both cases. 
 
In the Odyssey, then, atē and atasthaliai overlap where both refer to culpable error 
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 Similarly, Eurylochus’ claim that Odysseus’ companions perished as a result of his 
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that leads to disaster. Hector’s atasthaliai similarly refer to what he regards as a 
culpable error, but in his case the rapprochement of the two terms is influenced also 
by the incorporation of his atasthaliai within a thematic pattern that stretches from the 
abduction of Helen to the fall of Troy and is exemplified within the poem by the 
disastrous errors of Agamemnon, Achilles, and Patroclus. The rapprochement of the 
two terms is further illustrated by other contextual similarities between atē-scenarios 
and atasthaliē-scenarios, such as the association of both with the adjective nēpios.115 
The overlap, however, is only partial: to say that a person is atasthalos or guilty of 
atasthala is not to refer as such to the commission of a disastrous error; to describe 
such an error as atē is not necessarily to voice the moral condemnation that is entailed 
by atasthalos and atasthaliē. Though both can be used with identical reference to 
cases of disastrous and culpable error, the focus of atē is on the error and the disaster, 
while that of atashaliē is on the culpability. Yet the application of the terms in closely 
similar scenarios, especially in those which might be characterized in terms of hybris, 
facilitates and reflects the association of the two via the popular etymology that 
derives atasthaliē from τὸ  τῇ  ἄτῃ  θάλλειν. Atē is the more elusive and flexible 
term. In its shades of meaning, from mistake to moral error, it lends itself to rhetorical 
manipulation and facilitates a degree of ethical complexity. This is what makes it 
more applicable to the presentation of human error in the Iliad, where its central 
thematic location in the tragedy of Achilles, taking in the quarrel, the loss of 
Patroclus, and the death of Hector, contrasts with the programmatic appearance of 
atasthaliē in the opening passages of the Odyssey and the greater frequency of that 
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term throughout the poem.
116
 In that regard it is significant that even the Iliad’s salient 
occurrence of atasthaliē refers to a genuine (divinely inspired) error that is morally 
castigated not by its victim or its onlookers, but by its perpetrator, whereas the several 
instances of atasthaliai in the Odyssey simply illustrate that poem’s programmatic 
emphasis on the contribution that human beings’ transgressions make to their own 
misfortunes. 
 
The meaning of atē turns on the notion of ‘harm’. The prototypical sense in Homer is 
that of delusion (a harmful deterioration of mind), but this is always delusion that is 
diagnosed on the basis of its results (the harm that it causes). Hence the sense 
‘disaster’ (which is also found) is logically prior. Atē is not always exogenous; and 
when it is, its origin is not always divine. It is certainly not always exculpatory or 
even mitigatory. Its predominance in speech rather than narrative is important, as is its 
greater prominence in the Iliad than in the Odyssey, a feature of its thematic 
importance in the grand sequence of events that links Agamemnon’s error in Book 1, 
through Achilles’ rejection of the Embassy in Book 9 and the subsequent death of 
Patroclus, to the downfall of Hector. Atē is therefore integral to what Rutherford calls 
the poem’s tragic form and feeling. This sequence links the culpable error that 
Achilles diagnoses in Agamemnon in Book 1 to that for which Hector berates himself 
in Book 22, and thus permits investigation of a rapprochement between atē and 
atasthaliē. In Homer there is a genuine degree of overlap between the two concepts, 
but it is limited rather than systematic. It is on this limited overlap that later and more 
regular associations between atē, atasthaliē, hybris, and koros develop. 
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